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This article questions whether decreasing accountability by direc-
tors for their negligence, either by limiting liability or relaxing stan-
dards of due care, necessarily promotes states' interests. Specifically,
the article proposes that states enact legislation holding directors, for
actions pertaining to major1 transactions, to a standard of liability
more stringent than that imposed by statutes modeled after the Dela-
ware example. The proposed statute would hold directors liable for
the damages caused by their negligence to shareholders residing in the
enacting states. Because such a statute would aim to protect all resi-
dent shareholders victimized by directors' negligence, an effective
statute would need to reach directors of companies not incorporated in
1. The nature of the transactions to which the proposed statute would apply is dis-
cussed at Part I-B.
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the enacting state. The state of incorporation, however, can lay a pow-
erful claim to the prerogative of passing on derivative actions;2 hence,
the statute would have to be confined to direct actions alleging a
breach of duties owed to shareholders rather than to the corporate
entity itself. Suits brought under the statute would therefore assume
the form of shareholder class actions. Moreover, efficiency dictates
that courts entertain the class of all of the corporation's shareholders,
applying each shareholder's state's law governing due care and as-
signing damages accordingly.
The article principally identifies and responds to an array of poten-
tial objections against such application of local standards of care to di-
rectors of foreign corporations. In particular, the article focuses on
challenges that the statute exceeds the bounds of the enacting state's
authority under settled principles of federalism. In this view, consti-
tutional doctrines and choice-of-law consensus bar a state from ex-
tending its conception of fiduciary duties beyond its boundaries in the
manner proposed here. Each of these purported barriers, however, re-
flects an exaggerated notion of the exclusive prerogatives of states in
which a corporation is domiciled or does substantial business. Con-
versely, putative limitations on the authority of the enacting state un-
derestimate the extent to which modern doctrine accommodates state
solicitude for the economic well-being of its citizens. Although corpo-
rate tradition and culture have shied away from holding directors to
standards of care imposed by states other than the state of incorpora-
tion, the weight of these conventions does not translate into legal im-
pediments to the proposed outreach 3 statute.
I. A FIDUCIARY OUTREACH STATUTE: FIGHTING THE
TIDE OF DIRECTORS' FREEDOM FROM THE
CONSTRAINTS OF DUE CARE
A. Background: The Ascendancy of Permissive Legislation and
Contractarian Thought
Seven years ago the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van
2. Unlike the derivative suit, the shareholder multistate class action does not ineluc-
tably displace the lex incorporationis. A class action would apply the fiduciary
standard of each enacting state to the extent of its interest, as measured by the
shares held in that state. By contrast, the derivative suit seeks to vindicate the
unified interest of a single entity: viz., the corporation itself. See Note, Distin-
guishing Between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
1147, 1148 (1962). For that reason, the variation in claims and apportionment of
damages found in class actions are not available in a derivative suit. Thus, appli-
cation of a law other than the lex incorporationis necessarily entails rejection of
the law of the state of incorporation.
3. The term is Professor DeMott's. See Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice
of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 162
(1985).
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Gorkom4 startled many observers5 and dismayed the business commu-
nity6 by holding the directors of Trans Union Corporation liable for
their "grossly negligent"7 approval of a cash-out merger of Trans
Union into another company. In the face of widespread fear that ex-
cessive exposure to liability would send capable persons fleeing from
boardrooms and liability insurance spiraling to prohibitive levels,8 the
Delaware General Assembly played a legislative trump card by enact-
ing section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporation Code.9 This statute
empowers shareholders to insert in the certificate of incorporation
provisions that eliminate or limit directors' personal liability for
breach of the duty of care. Van Gorkom inspired apprehension be-
yond Delaware; most other states also passed legislation designed in
various ways to reduce the scope of potential director liability.10 Thus,
paradoxically, directorial decisionmaking enjoys considerably more
statutory protection than it did prior to Van Gorkom.
The rush to insulate directors from liability for negligence adds a
new chapter to the longstanding debate over whether competition for
corporate charters has created a "race for the bottom" destructive of
shareholders' welfare."1 As an empirical matter, both those who con-
4. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
5. See, e.g., Diedre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate Real-
ities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. CORP.
L. 311 (1986); Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past,
Present and Future, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 505, 526-27 (1985); Morton Moskin, Trans
Union: A Nailed Board, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 451 (1985); E. Norman Veasey,
Further Reflections on Court Review of Judgments of Directors: Is the Judicial
Process Under Control?, 40 Bus. LAw. 1373 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boar-
droom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1, 4 (1985). Anthony Baldo, Delaware
Rocks the Boat, FORBEs, Apr. 8, 1985, at 126; Richard M. Leisner, Boardroom Jit-
ters: A Landmark Court Decision Upsets Corporate Directors, BARRON's, April
22, 1985, at 34, 36-37.
7. Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 358, 881 (Del. 1985).
8. See, e.g., R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Commentary from the Bar, Elim-
ination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 5, 9 (1987); Karen Leigh Chapman, Statutory Responses to Boardroom
Fears, 3 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 749, 749-50 (1987); Roberta Romano, Corporate Gov-
ernance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160
(1990); E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with Three-Legged
Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAw. 399, 401
(1987).
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(19)(1981).
10. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Directors'Accountability: the Race to the Bot-
tom-the Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REV. 171 (1987).
11. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Modernization of Cor-
porate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 187, 188-91, 196-98, 202-
09 (1983); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 545, 548-51 (1984). For criticism of the proposition that Delaware law and
other states' emulation of its more permissive features harm shareholders' inter-
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demn the pressure for more lax corporate codes as a "sort of
Gresham's law"12 and those who sympathize with Delaware's philoso-
phy of corporate governance1 3 agree that corporations can readily
elude stricter duties for directors by selecting a congenial state of in-
corporation. Section 102(b)(7) and its counterparts typify both the
permissive nature of Delaware corporate law and the tendency of
other states to emulate Delaware's model. This article, then, seeks to
construct a legal framework for the "de-Delawarization" of at least
one aspect of corporate law by giving states the power to protect their
own resident shareholders from directors' negligence despite incorpo-
ration elsewhere.
The proposed statute also runs directly counter to the dominant
school of thought in contemporary scholarly discourse on corpora-
tions: the contractual model of the corporation.1 4 Contractarians
view the corporation as essentially a nexus of contracts. 15 Therefore,
under the contractarian view shareholders should be left free in most
matters to determine by agreement the rules under which corporate
relationships shall be conducted.6 Under prevailing contractarian
theory, then, the proposed statute's enforcement of the enacting
ests, see RICHARD POSNE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 390-92 (3d ed. 1986);
Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Marketfor Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy
Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Fischel, infra note
336.
12. Willis L.M. Reese & Edmund M. Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Af-
fairs: Choice of Law and Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
1118, 1127-28 (1958).
13. See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1599, 1599 (1989).
14. The literature on the contractual nature of corporate relationships is extensive.
For an overview of the contractual model and significant criticisms, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Foreword. The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989); see generally, Symposium: Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
15. The original conception of a nexus of contracts is generally attributed to Coase.
See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For later elabo-
ration of the economic model, see Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Many legal scholars have
also endorsed this characterization of the corporation. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel,
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,1261-62 (1982); Wil-
liam A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Con-
straints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1984).
16. This freedom is commonly characterized as the right to opt out of corporate law
rules prescribed by the state. For rationales, see Daniel R. Fischel & Michael
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 290-92 (1986);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
1993]
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state's standard of care rather than the standard of the incorporating
state would violate a fundamental tenet of corporate governance.17
The contractarian trend in legislation and legal thought recently
found further expression in the Corporate Governance Project of the
American Law Institute. The Institute endorsed the principle that in
derivative actions for breach of the duty of care, the recommendation
of a directors' special litigation committee to terminate the suit is not
reviewable, provided that the prerequisites of the business judgment
rule have been met.18 This provision essentially eliminates judicial re-
view in duty of care cases brought on behalf of the corporation.
Given the pervasive sympathy for contractarian ideology in mod-
ern corporate law, the proposed outreach statute might seem unfeasi-
ble or even preposterous. Adoption of the statute would plainly
challenge the prevailing legislative wisdom of minimal oversight. On
reflection, however, the statute can be seen as a plausible reaction to
an excessive erosion of director accountability. The widespread adop-
tion of limited liability statutes might not even reflect a reasoned
choice of minimal oversight, but instead might amount to an inordi-
nately sweeping response to specific (and temporary) problems arising
from the insurance crisisl9 and the excesses of the takeover boom.20
In the absence of federal minimum requirements,21 outreach legisla-
tion may represent the most effective device for restoring some mea-
sure of fiduciary standards.22 Indeed, the contract model itself has
VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The
New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HoFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984).
17. Even contractarians who might concede the validity of some mandatory fiduciary
rules, see Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1437-39 (1989), would undoubtedly object to interference
with the shareholders' presumed tacit agreement to be bound by the legal regime
of the state of incorporation. Cf. DeMott, supra note 3, at 162 (describing impli-
cations of contract model for constitutional choice of law).
18. Richard B. Smith, Motion to Amend § Z04(a) of the Proposed Final Draft, ALI
Corporate Governance Project Part VII (Remedies)(May 10, 1992).
19. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1158-59 (1990)(general increase in insurance rates dur-
ing 1980's); but see id. at 1188 (concluding that limited liability statutes probably
benefit shareholders).
20. See Dale A. Oesterle, The Effect of Statutes Limiting Directors'Due Care Liabil-
ity on Hostile Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1989).
21. See Cary, supra note 11, at 700-02 (finding prospect of federal incorporation "po-
litically unrealistic," but recommending federal fiduciary standards); see gener-
ally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992)(likelihood
that state competition for charters produces undesirable results for some issues
makes federal law rules appropriate).
22. A number of decisions holding directors liable for negligence indicate that an out-
reach statute would provide an opportunity to apply a meaningful standard of due
care. See, e.g., Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1986); Fitzpatrick v. FDIC,
765 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1985); Robinson v. Watt's Detective Agency, Inc., 685 F.2d
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been the subject of scholarly critique,23 and it should not be inevitably
advanced as a rule of nature.
This article leaves the ultimate debate over the contract model and
the desirability of state competition for charters24 to other forums.
This proposal for the statute assumes that mandatory rules in general
and a meaningful duty of due care in particular are useful ways for
states to protect resident shareholders in discrete situations. Thus,
rather than rehash the broader debate over such rules, the article ad-
dresses the concerns of a legislature which is already convinced of the
value of applying that state's duty of care to directors of foreign corpo-
rations, but which is also doubtful that this can be done within the
prevailing framework of law. The article seeks to demonstrate that
such a legislature need not be deterred by illusory restraints stemming
from a skewed vision of federalism.
B. Defining the Scope of the Statute
In proposing this statute, the realm of behavior that would subject
directors to liability must first be defined. A narrow compass would
help answer criticism that this type of statute would excessively dis-
tract directors by demanding that they keep a constant vigilance to a
variety of state standards. Accordingly, the statute should first set
729 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1705 (1983); Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc.,
624 P.2d 952 (Kan. 1981); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
Though it is often said that courts rarely rule against directors purely on a theory
of negligence, see Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J.
1078, 1099 (1968)(search for cases holding directors liable for lack of due care
without self-dealing is search for "a very small number of needles in a very large
haystack"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay
on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 789, 796
(1984) ("twilight existence" of duty of due care), these decisions show that some
jurisdictions seem inclined to make a policy choice different from that reflected
by Bishop's observation and the prevalence of opt-out statutes.
23. See, e.g., Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest" Efficiency, Fairness and Cor-
porate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REv. 738 (1978); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Con-
tractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter
Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820 (1989); Douglas M. Branson, Assault on
Another CitadeL Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applica-
ble to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REVimV 375 (1988); William W. Brat-
ton, Jr., The 'Vesus ofContracts" Corporation.: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 407 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Paul N. Cox, Reflections on
Ex Ante Compensation and Diversofation of Risk as Fairness Justifications for
Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers, Directors, and Controlling
Shareholders, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1987); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Cor-
porate Law, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1461 (1989); Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Per-
sona, Contract (and Market) Failure and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REv. 273
(1991).
24. The two issues are intertwined. See Bebchuk, supra note 21, at 1496-99.
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forth with particularity both the occasions that will trigger its scrutiny
for due care and then state the kinds of measures that will satisfy that
standard.
The statute should focus principally on transactions intended to ef-
fect a fundamental change in the control or character of the corpora-
tion.25 This would include mergers,26 tender offers, and sales or
purchases of a substantial amount of assets,27 as well as adoption of
defensive measures thereto, including lock-up agreements, crown
jewel options, poison pills, shareholder rights plans, dual class capital-
izations, and the like. It is in the course of these transactions that
shareholders typically have the largest stake in the conscientious ex-
ercise of judgment by their directors. At the same time, it is during
decisionmaking on these matters that directors are most likely to com-
mit blunders that will prove costly to shareholders. Moreover, be-
cause these transactions are infrequent, a heightened requirement of
due care would not disrupt or inhibit the ordinary course of
decisionmaking.
The statute also should indicate procedures whose undertaking
creates a strong presumption of sufficient care, thereby providing a
safe harbor for apprehensive directors.28 By the same token, a descrip-
tion of the principal lapses that may expose directors to liability would
alleviate the threat of unfair surprise. For example, the statute might
warn against a decision made without adequate consideration, as evi-
denced by the deliberation or haste with which it was made.2 9 In con-
cluding that the directors of Trans Union were grossly negligent in
approving a cash-out merger of the company, the Van Gorkom court
emphasized that the board had acted "upon two hours' consideration,
without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emer-
25. The application of the statute would not hinge on the success of the attempt.
26. The statute would reach directors of the successor as well as the merged corpora-
tion where absorption of the latter has a significant effect on the former.
27. Whether a sale of assets brings the statute into play would depend on the func-
tional question of the sale's impact on the corporation rather than on a formal
change in the corporation's structure. Compare Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143
A.2d 25, 31 (Pa. 1958)(reorganization agreement entailing sale of assets amounts
to de facto merger activating dissenters' appraisal rights under Pennsylvania law)
with Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 378 (Del. 1963)(purchase of all the stock
of seven corporations not treated as merger for purpose of determining dissent-
ers' rights under Delaware law).
28. Federal securities regulations offer a similar opportunity. Compliance with SEC
Rule 506, Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1992), qualifies an offering
for the exemption created by Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C.A. § 77(d)(2)(1981), for private offerings.
29. See Stephen A. Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 709 (1988). This article contains an analysis
of decisions in the years immediately following Van Gorkom that addressed
whether board action demonstrated a lack of due care.
[Vol. 72:1
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gency."30 Similarly, subsequent judicial assessments of a lack of due
care have almost invariably involved meetings whose brevity rendered
the quality of decisionmaking suspect.31 Conversely, when courts
have rejected allegations of directors' negligence, a longer meeting has
apparently been viewed as reflecting more thoughtful consideration.3 2
30. Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
31. See, e.g., Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 230 (S.D. Ohio), affid
mem., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987)(meeting of approximately thirty minutes); Plaza
Sec. Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1539 (E.D. Mich. 1986), affd sub
nom. Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1989)(poison pill approved by
board after "twenty minutes of discussion" based on recommendation issued
shortly before meeting by special committee "immediately after being advised of
the highlights of the transaction"); EAC Indus., Inc. v. Frantz Mfg. Co., 11 DEL. J.
CoRp. L. 608, 615, 620 (Del. Ch.), affd on other grounds, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
32. See, e.g., Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(meeting
lasted six hours); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal, 708 F. Supp. 984, 1010-
11 (E.D. Wis.) affd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989)(meetings lasting seven to eight
hours and four hours); Solash v. Telex Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,722, at
97, 728 (Del. Ch. 1988)(board meeting "hours long"); Coland v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 951 F.2d 1512, cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1943 (1992). Other factors that courts
take into account, and could be incorporated in the statute, include the amount of
information available to the board. See Int'l Banknote Co., Inc. v. Muller, 713 F.
Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(lack of due care where board voted on by-law which
had not yet been written); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349
(Del. 1985)(due care exercised where material on potential takeover problem and
proposed plan for preferred share purchase rights were distributed prior to meet-
ing), solicitation of advice from financial experts, see Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d
438, 443 (6th Cir. 1989); Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103,154-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); British Printing & Communication Corp. v. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 664 F. Supp. 1519, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Samjens Partners I v. Bur-
lington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Grobow v. Perot, 539
A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 939 (Del.
1985); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94,194, at 91,703 (Del. Ch. 1989); Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d
1051, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1987); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963,
971 (Del. Ch. 1986) and legal counsel, see, e.g., Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher,
728 F. Supp. 103, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191
(Del. 1988); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 939 (Del. 1985); Shamrock
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp. I, 559 A.2d 278, 287 (Del. Ch. 1989); In re RJR
Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,194, at 91,703 (Del. Ch.
1989), and evidence that directors actively considered the information and advice
provided them. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d at
264, 275 (lack of due care where directors "contented themselves with their finan-
cial advisor's conclusory opinion" as to fair value of Company); Plaza Sec. Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 64 3 F. Supp. 1535,1538 (E.D. Mich.)(lack of due care where direc-
tors "deferred entirely to the judgment of management and its management-se-
lected advisers"), affid sub nom. Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1989);
Int'l Banknote Co., Inc., v. Muller, 713 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988); Sealey Mat-
tress Co. v. Sealey, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324 (Del. Ch. 1987); EAC Industries, Inc. v.
Frantz Mfg. Co., 11 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 608, 620 (Del. Ch. June 28, 1985)(lack of due
care where board meeting was "conducted from a script prepared by counsel and
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It is doubtful whether a fiduciary outreach statute should apply to
conduct other than decisions on fundamental changes. In principle, a
state should not have to accede to other states' lax attitudes toward
the general directorial duty to monitor managers. The basic obligation
of attentiveness to the operations of the corporation is well-under-
stood and not controversial:
A director should become familiar with the fundamentals of the business in
which the corporation is engaged.... Directors are under a continuing obliga-
tion to keep informed about the activities of the corporation.... Directors may
not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and then claim that because they
did not see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look.
3 3
Nonetheless, courts, particularly those of Delaware, have exhibited a
pronounced reluctance to enforce this duty rigorously, even in the face
of evidence that directors have ignored or even condoned serious mis-
conduct by employees. 34 Accordingly, an outreach statute might stip-
ulate that failure to undertake specific types of investigatory steps
after suspect conduct has occurred, or even the absence of a mecha-
nism for ferreting out predictable types of injurious behavior, raises a
permissible inference of negligence that a director must rebut.
As a practical matter, however, extending the statute's scope to in-
clude ongoing managerial tasks would likely prove ill-advised. The
day-to-day occasions on which directors could be subject to charges of
which had an aura of inevitability"), affd on other grounds, 501 A.2d 401 (Del.
1985). For a canvass of the earmarks of adequate process, see Douglas M. Bran-
son, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 97, 99-110 (1989).
33. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-22 (N.J. 1981)(holding director
liable for negligence in failing to detect and to try preventing other directors'
misappropriation of funds); see Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir.
1982) cert denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983)(personal liability based in part on Moody's
negligent management of corporation's business affairs); Barnes v. Andrews, 298
F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)(violation of director's duty to inform himself
found where severe losses resulting from delays in production might have been
averted or reduced by director's reviewing progress of production, investigating
reasons for delay, and considering possible means of redressing underlying
problems); see also Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529-31 (1920)(president but not
directors of national bank liable for negligence where apparent shrinkage in de-
posits and other indications should have alerted president to possibility of thefts
by employees and necessity of taking steps to prevent future fraud); CORPORATE
DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK (1978), reprinted in 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1602-03 (1978).
34. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. Ch. 1963)(defend-
ant directors and officers held not to violate duty to supervise though not de-
tecting and attempting to prevent participation by corporation's employees in
pervasive scheme to violate antitrust laws); JOHN BROOKS, BUSINESS ADVEN-
TURES 199-223 (1969)(describing scale of antitrust conspiracy in which Allis-Chal-
mers employees were involved); Richard J. Spelts, Note, Corporations-
Directors-Extent of Duty to Install Internal Control Systems to Prevent Anti-
Trust Violations by Subordinates, 35 U. COLO. L. REV. 619 (1963); see also P.T.
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch.
1969).
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negligence for inadequately monitoring the company's operations are
not clearly defined. Thus, an outreach statute's imposition of liability
on these grounds might give directors insufficient notice of those in-
stances in which states other than the state of incorporation may ex-
pect heightened diligence. In addition, the resulting preoccupation
with the application of a multiplicity of standards could inhibit direc-
tors' decisionmaking. On balance, the prospect of frequent and pro-
tracted litigation, especially when factual issues concerning directors'
awareness may prove exceptionally difficult, probably outweighs any
incremental gain in accountability.
II. THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION
The threshold, and in many instances the most formidable, obsta-
cle to shareholder class actions brought outside the state of incorpora-
tion35 is the necessity of asserting jurisdiction over defendant
directors. Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in International
Shoe v. Washington,36 the touchstone for the exercise of jurisdiction
has been the existence of "minimum contacts"3 7 between the parties-
especially the defendant-and the forum state. The plausibility of a
forum state's claim of jurisdiction over a nonresident director varies
with the weight and character of such contacts. Jurisdiction thus poses
a very context-specific hurdle. For that reason, after a brief review of
the constitutional principles governing jurisdiction, the next three
subsections describe three basic possible levels of contact between a
director and a forum state; these are presented in order of their in-
creasingly problematic jurisdictional grasp. A separate section specifi-
cally focuses on the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts,38 addressing jurisdiction in
shareholder multistate class actions. The discussion contends that
while jurisdiction over nonresident directors may entail an extension
of settled principles, that extension involves no greater leap than the
Court has already made in abandoning rigid territorial rules for more
realistic and flexible analyses.
A. Due Process and Minimum Contacts
The Supreme Court has never reduced the concept of minimum
contacts to a mechanical formula. Rather, the Court has tended to
weigh the particular facts in each of its many rulings on jurisdiction,
rendering individualized decisions in pointillist fashion. Nevertheless,
35. In some cases even the state of incorporation may lack sufficient contacts with
the director to assert jurisdiction.
36. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
37. Id at 316.
38. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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a number of distinct concerns have crystallized from which one can
venture an informed prediction of the Court's attitude toward a given
attempt to assert jurisdiction.3 9
These concerns flow from the two functions the Court has identi-
fied as served by the minimum contacts test: to safeguard defendants
against "the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum"
and to "ensure that the states, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system."40 While the latter concern with interstate federalism
is still occasionally suggested by rules defined by territorial bounda-
ries,4 ' that concern has been submerged in recent years beneath the
Court's primary emphasis of protecting the defendant's liberty.42
Thus, International Shoe's requirement that in personam jurisdiction
not offend" 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,' "43
and its proscription of jurisdiction by a state with which the defendant
has no significant "contacts, ties, or relations," 44 must be viewed prin-
cipally through the prism of the defendant's right not to be onerously
subjected to the judgment of an objectionable forum.
The Court's replacement of strict territorial tenets, exemplified by
Pennoyer v. Neff 45 with a more practical approach is illustrated by
39. The fairly succinct overview of constitutional principles of jurisdiction offered
here obviously lacks the breadth and depth of commentary devoted specifically to
that subject. For extended analysis and a range of theories of jurisdiction, see
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 241; Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1981); William J. Knudsen, Jr., Keeton, Calder,
Helicopteros, and Burger King-International Shoe's Most Regent Progeny, 39 U.
MIAmI L. REv. 809 (1985); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and
Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85 (1983); Martin H. Redish, Due Process Feder-
alism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV.
1112 (1981); Arthur T. von Mehran & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adju-
dicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
40. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
41. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)(defendant's voluntary
physical presence in state sufficient to establish jurisdiction); see also Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (restrictions on personal jurisdiction not only "a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation," but also "conse-
quence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States").
42. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (requirement of personal jurisdiction "comes
from the Due Process Clause's protection the defendant's of personal liberty in-
terest, and ... 'represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sover-
eignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.' ")(quoting Insurance Corp. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03, n.10)(1982)).
43. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)(citation omitted).
44. Id at 319.
45. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer held that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory" and that "no
State can exercise." Arguably, Pennoyer did not demand constitutionalization of
the territorial principles of jurisdiction, but instead simply allowed the defendant
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International Shoe itself. There, the Court upheld the Washington
court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over International Shoe,
notwithstanding the absence of the literal physical presence required
under Pennoyer.4 6 Similarly, Shaffer v. Heitner47 later reversed Pen-
noyer's plenary grant of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction based on
the simple presence of the defendant's property within the forum
state; Shaffer subjected those assertions of jurisdiction as well to the
criterion of minimum contacts.48 More recent cases have tacitly af-
firmed the subordinate significance of physical ties-or more pre-
cisely, a paucity of such ties-between the defendant and a forum state
in which the defendant has otherwise elected meaningful
involvement. 49
The Court has set forth with notable candor the anti-formalist rea-
soning behind its abandonment of rigid jurisdictional standards. For
example, to justify in part the broadened scope of in personam juris-
diction, the Court has pointed to the "increasing nationalization of
commerce... [accompanied by] modern transportation and communi-
cation [that] have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to
defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."50
Such considerations enter into the Court's larger equitable inquiry of
"whether the 'quality and nature' of the defendant's activity is such
that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in
that State."51 This inquiry is guided by the functionalist philosophy
that "[m]echanical or quantitative evaluation of the defendant's activi-
ties [can] not resolve the question of reasonableness." 52
These general precepts of fairness and reasonableness subsume
three distinct requirements. First, voicing a traditional due process
concern with adequate notice, the Court has repeatedly insisted that
the exercise of jurisdiction be the foreseeable result of voluntary con-
an opportunity to contest jurisdiction. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and
Back Again, 24 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 19, 32-43 (1990). However, Pennoyer eventu-
ally came to stand for the proposition that the due process clause sets an outer
limit on a state's territorial reach. See, e.g., Riverside v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189
(1915)(due process limits state court recognition of one of its own judgments).
46. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315-20 (1945).
47. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
48. Id. at 207-09.
49. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)(sustaining Florida
court's jurisdiction in contract action by Florida corporation against Michigan
franchise); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)(sustaining New
Hampshire court's jurisdiction over Ohio corporation based on fraction of corpo-
ration's allegedly defamatory publication that circulated in New Hampshire).
50. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
51. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)(citation omitted).
52. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
duct which the defendant could have foregone to avoid the forum.53
Only when the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State" 54 or has intentionally di-
rected its activities at residents of the forum5 5 may the defendant
properly be deemed to have, in a sense, assumed the risk of subjection
to the jurisdiction of that state. Due process thus assures the predict-
ability that inheres in individuals' ability to "structure their primary
conduct" to choose where they may be exposed to liability.56
Second, the Court has manifested a concern that the basis for juris-
diction must have some congruence with the claim stated. The repug-
nance of forcing a defendant to appear before a court based merely on
"random,"5 7 "fortuitous,"5 8 or "attenuated"59 contacts with the forum
requires that these contacts bear some relationship to the subject mat-
ter of the litigation in which the defendant has been summoned to
court. This concept of congruence is captured by the Court's focus on
"the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion,"60 as well as by its mandate that the litigation "arise out of or
relate to" the defendant's involvement with the forum state.6 ' For
example, where the claim against the nonresident was not related to
the property in the forum state upon which in rem jurisdiction was
based,6 2 the lack of "substantial connection"6 3 between the contact
with the state and the subject matter of litigation was fatal to the as-
sertion of jurisdiction.64
53. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)("T]he
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis... is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)(jurisdiction valid where the contacts between defendant
and forum state "proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that
create a substantial connection with the forum state")(citation omitted).
54. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
55. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)(citation omitted).
56. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
57. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
58. Id.
59. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980).
60. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
61. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
62. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
63. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
64. The modern ascendancy of so called specific jurisdiction evidences the centrality
of the nexus requirement. See Stanley E. Cox, Comment, Giving the Boot to the
Long-Arm: Analysis of Post-International Shoe Supreme Court Personal Juris-
diction Decisions, Emphasizing Unrealized Implications of the "Minimum Con-
tacts" Test, 75 Ky. L.J. 885, 897 (1987). However, the persistence of general
jurisdiction under special circumstances does not refute the notion of congruence.
The division of jurisdiction into the categories of general and specific, with a pref-
erence for the latter, can be traced to Professors von Mehran and Trautman. See
ARTHUR VON MEHRAN & DONALD T. TRAuniAN, MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 654
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Third, although a forum state can demonstrate minimum contacts
by showing foreseeability and congruence, the presence of such con-
tacts does not always suffice to establish jurisdiction. In addition, the
Supreme Court has enumerated a set of essentially equitable consider-
ations that, if compelling,65 may defeat otherwise valid jurisdiction.
These include "the burden on the defendant," "the forum State's in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief," "the interstate judicial system's inter-
est in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," and
"the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies."6 6 Conversely, when such considerations
militate strongly in the plaintiff's favor, they may bolster an otherwise
shaky conclusion that minimum contacts exist.67
B. Asserting Jurisdiction Over Directors: Varying Scales Of Difficulty
The disparate strength of various state claims of jurisdiction over
directors of foreign corporations precludes a single analysis of the va-
lidity of those claims. Nevertheless, the range of possible contacts be-
tween a director and a forum state can be usefully understood as
(1965); Arthur von Mehran & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). The Supreme Court has
embraced this distinction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8-9 (1984);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984). In cases in which specific jurisdiction
exists, the dispute stems directly from the links between the defendant and the
forum state. See von Mehran & Trautman, supra note 64, at 1136. General juris-
diction is based more broadly on the defendant's contacts with the state, regard-
less of the nature of the litigation, see Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 611 (1988), and is typically invoked to reach
corporations regularly doing a substantial amount of business in the forum. See
Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Constitutional Limitations,
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 9, 14 (1988). Rather than discarding the entire concept of
nexus, general jurisdiction in effect presumes that where a corporation's involve-
ment with the forum state is sufficiently "continuous and systematic," Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952), that state has a signifi-
cant interest in any dispute between the corporation and one of the state's resi-
dents. A similar kind of sliding scale exists in the constitutional doctrine of
defamation applied to public officials. While the stringent "actual malice" stan-
dard protects only those alleged defamations of public officials that relate to the
plaintiff's official conduct, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant either knew that
the statement was false or had acted with reckless disregard of whether it was
false), the more prominent the plaintiff's position in the government hierarchy,
the more every aspect of her conduct and character is regarded as relevant to her
fitness for office. See Clawson v. Longview Publishing Co., 589 P.2d 1223, 1228
(Wash. 1979).
65. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
66. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
67. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
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falling into three principal groupings. A pervasive concern coloring
all discussion of jurisdiction over directors, however, is apprehension
that an overly expansive theory of jurisdiction will subject directors to
lawsuits with intolerable frequency.68
1. Substantial Corporate and Director Involvement in the
Forum State
The least troubling case for jurisdiction over directors occurs
where the foreign corporation is doing regular and substantial busi-
ness in the forum state and one or more69 of its directors have engaged
in significant activities on behalf of the corporation in that state.
Under this set of facts, the defendant presumptively cannot invoke the
absence or paucity of contacts with the state as grounds for resisting
jurisdiction. Unless the defendant director is domiciled in the forum
state,70 however, or has otherwise maintained an ongoing physical
presence there73 jurisdiction will be based on acts associated with the
director's assumption of tasks on behalf of the corporation. Basing a
claim of jurisdiction on those contacts alone, however, entails a
number of possible objections.
a. The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine
One ground upon which many directors can be expected to chal-
lenge jurisdiction by a distant forum is the "fiduciary shield doctrine."
This doctrine provides that acts taken by a defendant in his or her
capacity as a corporate employee do not amount to sufficient contacts
to satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction.72 The doctrine
68. See Thomas H. Sponsler, Jurisdiction Over the Corporate Agent The Fiduciary
Shield, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349, 362 (1978). In some cases the enforceability
of the forum's judgment might also present practical problems. However, given
the mandated enforcement of judgments under the full faith and credit clause,
see Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942); Roche v. McDonald, 275
U.S. 449, 451-52 (1928), and the powerful means available to courts to force com-
pliance with their order, see Note, Forum Nonconveniens as a Substitute for the
Internal Affairs Rule, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 234, 248-50 (1958), the discussion here
will assume effective means of enforcement.
69. Most states provide for joint and several liability for collaborative tortfeasors act-
ing negligently in concert. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Larkin, 98 N.E.2d 280, 286-87
(Mass. 1951); Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1984).
Many modern statutes also permit contribution among all tortfeasors whom the
injured person could hold jointly and severably liable. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.31
(West 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 231B, § 1-4 (West 1986).
70. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464 (1940).
71. See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
72. Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981); Bulova Watch Co.
v. K. Hattori & co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1348-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally
Jennifer Babbin, Note, The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine Minimum Contacts in a
Special Context," 65 B.U. L. REV. 967 (1985); Robert A. Koenig, Note, Personal
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rests upon the belief in the intrinsic unfairness of subjecting a corpo-
rate employee to a suit for personal liability when her only involve-
ment with the forum state was triggered by service performed for the
benefit of the corporation.7 3 Two variations in the way that the doc-
trine is formulated affects its scope from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
One version of the doctrine provides that contacts which would sup-
port jurisdiction over a corporation cannot alone supply jurisdiction
over a corporate employee who lacks independent contacts with the
forum state.74 In contrast to this modest proposition, the more expan-
sive version of the doctrine completely insulates an otherwise reach-
able defendant from jurisdiction because her contacts were activated
by responsibilities as a corporate employee. 75 While some decisions
have inferred a fiduciary shield rule from state long-arm statutes,7 6
others have elevated the doctrine to a constitutional principle man-
dated by due process. 77
For purposes of assessing jurisdiction over allegedly negligent di-
rectors, only the latter contention-that due process bars jurisdiction
over individuals whose corporate activities have brought them into
contact with the forum state-must be addressed. Commentators
have properly criticized the notion that constitutional principles com-
pel the fiduciary shield doctrine.78 Although the Supreme Court has
recognized that the differences between individuals and corporations
may under some circumstances permit state jurisdiction over the one
but not the other,79 that recognition hardly leads to the wholesale ex-
clusion of corporate employees qua employees from foreign states' ju-
Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduci-
ary Shield, 38 STAN. L. REV. 813 (1986).
73. See Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
74. See Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798, 803-04 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
75. See Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1349
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
76. E.g., United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
384 U.S. 919 (1966); Zemen v. Lotus Heart, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D. Md.
1989); Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1049
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Rollins v. Ellwood, 565 N.E.2d 1302 (III. 1990). In addition, other
courts have described the fiduciary shield rule as an equitable doctrine, e.g., Sak-
tides v. Cooper, 742 F. Supp. 382, 385 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack
Co. of Boca, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), or as a common law
doctrine. E.g., In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Li-
tig., 750 F. Supp. 330, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
77. E.g., Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir.),
affd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975); Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 931 (6th
Cir. 1974).
78. E.g., Sponsler, supra note 68, at 353-56; Note, The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine: A
Tool for Statutory Construction or a Constitutional Principle?, J. CORP. L. 901
(1985); Koenig, supra note 57, at 829-33. But see Babbin, supra note 72 (arguing
that doctrine expresses due process concerns).
79. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.19 (1977).
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risdictional grasp. On the contrary, there is nothing inherent in "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,"8 0
that places nonresident corporate managers and agents categorically
beyond the pale of state jurisdiction. Indeed, given the Court's refusal
to permit so weighty a value as first amendment concerns even to
enter into jurisdictional analysis,8 1 it follows that the fiduciary shield
doctrine cannot entirely short-circuit jurisdictional analysis.
In essence, the fiduciary shield doctrine's effort to preempt the
minimum contacts standard's individualized inquiry with a wooden
rule2 belies the doctrine's pretensions to constitutional stature. The
inflexibility of the doctrine guarantees that its impact will often un-
dermine rather than advance the due process concerns that support
the minimal contacts inquiry. Moreover, the creation of a privileged
class of individuals flies in the face of the trend, already evident over
thirty years ago,8 3 of enlarging rather than contracting the scope of
state jurisdiction. In a sense, the several exceptions8 4 permitted even
by courts that embrace the fiduciary shield doctrine represent tacit
acknowledgement that the rule's sweeping nature is incompatible
with the nuanced philosophy of due process. In fact, recognition that
relevant considerations of fairness are better accommodated by Inter-
national Shoe's requirement of "'fair play and substantial justice' "85
has led the New York Court of Appeals to reject not only the constitu-
tional underpinnings of the fiduciary shield doctrine, but also the rule
itself.86
A pair of companion defamation decisions by the Supreme Court
confirm that the fiduciary shield doctrine is at most a creature of stat-
utory construction. Calder v. Jones87 directly confronted the issue of
jurisdiction over individual employees of a corporation, sustaining Cal-
ifornia's exercise of jurisdiction over a reporter and editor living in
Florida and working for a newspaper headquartered in Florida. While
conceding that the newspaper's contacts with California did not auto-
matically confer jurisdiction over the paper's employees,88 the Court
flatly stated that the defendants' "status as employees does not some-
how insulate them from jurisdiction."8 9 If there was anything equivo-
80. Id. at 204.
81. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
82. But see Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1981)(as "equi-
table principle," doctrine not to be "applied mechanically").
83. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
84. See Koenig, supra note 72, at 823-28.
85. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 301, 316 (1945)(citation omitted).
86. Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 46-47 (N.Y. 1988); see also Real
Properties, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 427 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1988)(appearing to
question merits of fiduciary shield doctrine).
87. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
88. Id. at 790.
89. Id.
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cal about Calder's demolition of any constitutional footing for the
fiduciary shield rule, the Court's opinion in Keeton v. Hustler Maga-
zine Inc. removed that doubt.90 Keeton specifically characterized Cal-
der as "reject[ing] the suggestion that employees who act in their
official capacity are somehow shielded from suit in their individual ca-
pacity." 9 ' Although attempts have been made to rationalize Calder's
and Keeton's pronouncements as compatible with the theory that the
fiduciary shield rule has a due process dimension,92 recognition ap-
pears to be gaining that Calder and Keeton have devastating implica-
tions for the rule.93
b. The Relationship Between the Director's Contacts and Her
Negligence
A second objection that a defendant director may raise rests upon
an assertedly tenuous link between the source of the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state and the negligent conduct with which she is
charged. That is, even if the director's business and other activities
have brought her into frequent contact with the state, these contacts
may arguably have no direct bearing on the injury resulting from her
negligence. Although dismissal of jurisdiction under these circum-
stances can be framed as a corollary of the fiduciary duty rule,94 reser-
vations about such jurisdiction are more usefully understood as
flowing from the due process requirement of congruence.9 5 Of course,
if the state may exercise general jurisdiction-which some authority
indicates may be based solely on an individual's business contacts with
a state96-then the burden of demonstrating a more tailored fit among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation is removed. Otherwise,
under the more stringent97 test for specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff
90. 465 U.s. 770 (1984).
91. Id. at 781 n.13.
92. See Babbin, supra note 72, at 978-81.
93. See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 46-47 (N.Y. 1988).
94. See Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171,182-83
(D. Idaho 1976)(jurisdiction improper where nonresident corporate employee has
not committed tort in forum state).
95. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
96. See Hutton v. Piepgras, 451 F. Supp. 205, 207 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Columbia Pic-
tures Indus., Inc. v. Schneider, 435 F. Supp. 742, 748 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) affd 573
F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1978); Laufer v. Ostrow, 434 N.E.2d 692, 696 (N.Y. 1982); Abkco
Indus., Inc. v. Lennon, 377 N.Y.S.2d 362, affd 384 N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976).
97. Precisely how much more stringent may be unclear. See Lea Brilmayer, How
Contacts Count Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup.
CT. REV. 77, 82 (lack of clear analysis of concept that forum is "'related to' "
controversy or that cause of action "'arose out of' defendant's activities in fo-
rum"); see also Twitchell, supra note 64, at 610 (confusion by courts over distinc-
tion between general and specific jurisdiction).
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must show that the dispute has arisen out of the defendant's contacts
with the state.98
As suggested by earlier criticism of the fiduciary shield doctrine's
rigidity,99 the variety of possible director's contacts with a forum state
and their connection with a suit for breach of the duty of due care
cannot be disposed of by a single rule. At one extreme, the mere pres-
ence of a director's personal property in the forum state clearly could
not form the basis for jurisdiction. 10 0 Still insufficient, absent more,101
would be scattered financial transactions by the director within the
forum.102 Conversely, if a corporation's officer enters a state to con-
duct negotiations for the corporation's sale to a resident of property
located within the state, courts would find no difficulty in sustaining
the state's jurisdiction over that officer in a suit alleging fraudulent
misrepresentation in the course of the negotiations. 03
Jurisdiction over a director whose alleged negligence is not an im-
mediate outgrowth of her substantial activities in the forum state oc-
cupies an uncertain place on this spectrum of relationships. For
example, suppose that a director in her dual capacity as an officer con-
ducted a long series of major negotiations for the corporation in the
forum state, while her purported misconduct consists of carelessly en-
dorsing an unrelated improvident merger. On the one hand, the direc-
tor's contacts with the forum arguably are too removed from the cause
of action to support jurisdiction.104 On the other hand, a strict re-
quirement that a director's negligent vote spring directly from her ac-
tivities in the forum would result in almost wholesale nullification of
98. Simpson v. Quality Oil Co., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 382, 390 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Standard
Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Western Finance Inc., 436 F. Supp. 843, 846 (W.D.
Okla. 1977); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977)(quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion invalid where property in forum state was totally unrelated to suit against
defendant); see also Rush v. Savachuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)(presence within forum
of contractual commitment by defendant's insurance company to defend and in-
demnify defendant insufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction over defendant).
99. See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text.
100. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
101. See infra notes 131-141 and accompanying text (discussing significance of jurisdic-
tional statute).
102. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-18 (1984)(cor-
poration's acceptance of checks drawn on Texas banks and purchases of helicop-
ter equipment from Texas manufacturer insufficient to establish jurisdiction by
Texas court in wrongful death action against foreign corporation).
103. Columbia Briargate Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 713 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
104. See Young v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d 567, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1986) (nonresi-
dent defendant director falls outside ambit of state long-arm statute because
plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duties did not arise from director's con-
tacts with state); see also Rollins Burdick Hunter of So. California, Inc. v. Alexan-
der & Alexander Services, Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Cal. App. Dist. 1988); Banton
v. Opryland U.S.A., Inc., 767 P.2d 584, 587 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
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specific jurisdiction over directors, achieving by "fact specific" indirec-
tion what the fiduciary shield rule does by fiat. Accordingly, if actions
for lack of due care of the type proposed here are to be preserved
outside those instances where general jurisdiction exists, something
short of an overwhelming causal connection must suffice. 05
The steady extension of jurisdictional reach in the modern era,106
as well as the Court's reasoning in Calder, provide considerable lati-
tude to states seeking to assert jurisdiction over directors who have
had meaningful contacts with those states. In Calder, the individual
defendants' contacts with California bore scant relationship to their
alleged defamation of Jones.07 Indeed, the editor of the offending ar-
ticle had traveled to California to take a pleasure trip and to testify at
a trial unrelated to the libel action.10 8 Nevertheless, the Court, in sus-
taining California's jurisdiction, relied heavily on the fact that the "ef-
fects" of the defendants' actions were felt chiefly in that state.109
Similarly, the effect of directors' negligence-economic loss in the
form of diminished value of shares-is typically suffered predomi-
nantly, if not exclusively, in the stockholder's domicile.0
c. Burden on the Director
One respect in which fairness concerns"' legitimately enter into
105. Again, this assumption does not take into account the impact of an explicit juris-
dictional statute.
106. The notable increase in the number and scope of state long-arm statutes reflects
the Supreme Court's expanding license to exercises of personal jurisdiction. See 2
ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVn, ACTIONS § 4.01 (2d ed. 1991).
107. The contacts by Defendant South, a reporter, were confined to "frequent trips
and phone calls" to the state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 787, 789.
110. It may be granted that a director's knowledge that her negligence may produce
harm to stockholders in a given state is less "targeted" to that state than libel
against an entertainer whose career and professional reputation are centered in
the state of her residence. See id. at 788-90. However, if a large number of share-
holders are concentrated in a particular state, the argument that the directors
should have been conscious of the impact of their actions in that state becomes
more powerful. Furthermore, in the scenario assumed in this discussion, the de-
fendant director has had substantially more contact with the forum state than
defendant Calder had had with California. Thus, the cumulative quality of con-
tacts with and foreseeable impact in the forum state produces, on balance, compa-
rably compelling bases for personal jurisdiction in the two cases.
111. At bottom, most arguments asserting the unfairness of subjecting a director to a
forum state's standard for negligence seem directed more toward the issue of
choice of law than that of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, has drawn a
sharp distinction between the two concepts and the tests that govern them. See
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958); see also Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of
Choice of Law: the Priority of Fairness over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 712
(1987). But see Alfred Hill, Choice of Law Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81
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jurisdictional analysis is in the assessment of the defendant's "burdens
of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum."1 1 2 Not only does the
requirement of minimum contacts incorporate protection against such
burdens, but due process also invalidates exercises of jurisdiction that
make litigation "so gravely difficult and inconvenient" that a defend-
ant is placed at a harsh disadvantage relative to the plaintiff.1 13 On
occasion the Court has cited such burdens as leading grounds for strik-
ing down an exercise of jurisdiction.114 In the case of corporate direc-
tors, this concern is compounded by the specter of wide-open
jurisdiction subjecting directors to the demands of an unlimited
number of states and stockholders31 5
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has made clear that solicitude for
the defendant's convenience, however important a consideration, does
not automatically raise an insurmountable obstacle to jurisdiction by
remote forums. The salient forces reducing constitutional barriers to
jurisdiction-the "fundamental transformation in the American econ-
omy1 16" that has broadened the reverberations of commercial conduct,
and technological advances that have eased the burden of defending
suits in foreign tribunalsl7--would seem to have special aptness for
directors of largelS corporations. Even where the Court has not ex-
pressly taken into account the resources available to the defendant
(and where free speech concerns might have given pause to a forum's
extended reach), the Court has upheld cross-country jurisdiction.11 9
COLUM. L. REv. 960, 993 (1981). Accordingly, much of the consideration of
charges of unfairness is deferred to the discussion of the full faith and credit
clause. See infra Part III.
112. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
113. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972). In addition to consti-
tutional safeguards, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) codifies the common-law doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other dis-
trict or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)(1988).
See Note, supra note 68.
114. Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)(severe burden
on Japanese company); Kulko v. California Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 97
(1978) (substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child-sup-
port suit in a forum 3,000 miles away).
115. See Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Leonard Storch Enterprises, Inc., 383 N.E.2d
1379, 1384 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
116. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
117. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1958).
118. Without being bound by precise figures, one can fairly assume that an action of
the kind proposed here would not be brought unless the stakes-for the attorney
as well as for the name-plaintiff-were substantial. Certainly, except in the case
of a director with unusually deep pockets, the action would not be worthwhile
unless the corporation was willing and able to commit ample resources to indem-
nification or insurance.
119. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)(jurisdiction in libel suit by California
court over editor and reporter who were Florida residents); see also Keeton v.
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Moreover, the burden imposed upon a director is not the only part
of the due process equation. The defendant's establishment of mini-
mum contacts remains the fundamental criterion, and where the de-
fendant has deliberately "directed his activities at forum residents,"
he must make out a "compelling case" to show that countervailing
considerations override the presumption of jurisdiction. 20 In deter-
mining whether jurisdiction would be unreasonable despite the pres-
ence of minimum contacts, a court must weigh other factors12 1 that
may well tilt toward the exercise of jurisdiction. In the case of a
shareholder suit for directors' negligence, the shareholders' "interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief" and the "fundamental so-
cial policies"122 underlying the forum's standard of due care should
normally defeat a director's plea of inconvenience.
Ironically, arguments that jurisdiction in states other than that of
incorporation might be barred because of inconvenience to the defend-
ant directors-arguments typically invoked to support deference to
Delaware courts-are further eroded by Delaware's own insistence on
serving as a forum in all suits against directors of domestic corpora-
tions.123 The Delaware Supreme Court has rejected "mere conven-
ience of the parties" as grounds for relinquishing jurisdiction in such
suits where jurisdiction may be constitutionally asserted by the
state. 2 4 The court reasoned that Delaware has a strong interest in
ensuring that its law is applied by an authoritative arbiter.125 This
precise reasoning, however, can also be invoked by states seeking to
enforce their own notions of due care.
2. Prior Contacts by Corporation, but Not by Director
In some instances a state might seek to hold accountable directors
of a corporation doing substantial business in the state who them-
selves have not forged conventional contacts with that forum. An as-
sertion of jurisdiction under such circumstances would represent an
ambitious but not implausible extension of established principles of
due process. Admittedly, this attempt seems to clash directly with
both Shaffer's specific holding and its more general command that all
jurisdiction be grounded in minimum contacts between the defendant
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)(jurisdiction in libel suit by New
Hampshire court over Ohio corporation with principal place of business in Cali-
fornia); Mays v. Lavrant Publishing Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
120. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
121. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
122. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
123. See 10 DEL. CODE § 3114 (acceptance of directorship of Delaware corporation en-
tails consent to Delaware jurisdiction in suits involving defendant's conduct as
director).
124. Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 178 (Del. 1980).
125. Id. at 177-78.
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and the forum. However, a close reading of Shaffer, combined with
subsequent developments, suggests that the Court would sympatheti-
cally entertain an appropriately framed theory to uphold the forum's
claim in at least some situations.
a. The Relevance of Legislation
The Shaffer Court struck down Delaware's attempt to exercise ju-
risdiction over nonresident corporate officers named as defendants in
a stockholder derivative suit. Neither the statutory presence of the
defendants' stock in Delaware126 nor the defendants' status as officers
of a Delaware corporation 127 comprised the necessary level of mini-
mum contacts required for "all assertions of state-court jurisdic-
tion."128 Later Court decisions reinforced Shaffer's message that some
contacts were too insubstantial reasonably to provide an adequate
foundation for jurisdiction.
For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Wood-
son,129 the plaintiffs had purchased an automobile from a New York
dealer and then driven it to Oklahoma, where it was struck in the rear
by another car. Alleging that the fire produced by the collision was
caused by defects in their car's design, the plaintiffs brought suit in
Oklahoma against, among others, the car's regional distributor (head-
quartered in New York) and the New York dealer. The Court was
unimpressed by the plaintiffs' argument that the financial benefit that
these two defendants derived from the sale of cars destined to travel
to Oklahoma had created a significant connection with that state.
Rather, the "marginal revenues" derived by these New York busi-
nesses from the capacity of their products to be used in Oklahoma was
considered "far too attenuated a contact" to sustain Oklahoma's exer-
cise of in personam jurisdiction.130
Against this precedential background, the notion that a director ac-
cused of negligence could be summoned to defend her conduct in a
state where she had not previously chosen to involve herself might
seem untenable. Nevertheless, the principle of Shaffer does not fore-
close the possibility of jurisdiction in such a case, for the Court re-
frained from pronouncing minimum contacts a universal sine qua non
of jurisdiction. Rather, the Court was careful to note the absence of
statutes explicitly asserting Delaware's interest in having jurisdiction
126. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
127. Id. at 215-16.
128. Id at 212.
129. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
130. Id. at 299. For similarly insufficient bases of jurisdiction, see Rush v. Savachuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980), described at supra note 98. See also Kulko v. California Supe-
rior Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
[Vol. 72:1
SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS
over fiduciaries of its corporations' 3 ' and deeming acceptance of a di-
rectorship as consent to jurisdiction in the state.1 32 Had the legisla-
ture formally declared a significant interest in holding certain
corporate personnel accountable, and promulgated as well a jurisdic-
tional statute implementing that interest, Shaffer suggests that the
Court might have suspended the ordinary requirement of a prior in-
dependent connection between the defendant and forum. By making
certain acts tantamount to explicit consent, such statutes may place
the jurisdictional standard outside the regime of Shaffer and Interna-
tional Shoe, for those two cases analyzed state attempts to reach de-
fendants through implied consent. Since Shaffer the Court has again
called attention to the absence of a special jurisdictional statute in
striking down an attempted exercise of jurisdiction, 3 3 and has ac-
knowledged that a right to resist personal jurisdiction may be waived
by express consent.134
By legislatively announcing its intention to assert jurisdiction over
directors whose negligence harms its residents, a state can supply the
"foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis."135 Like the na-
tionally distributed magazine that can be "charged with knowledge of
the 'single publication rule"' subjecting it to a suit for nationwide
damages,13 6 and unlike the Shaffer directors who had "no reason to
expect to be haled" before a Delaware court,3 7 directors whose corpo-
ration does business and sells shares in a state with an explicit juris-
dictional statute have "fair warning" that their negligence "may
subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."138 While it
may be objected that this statute would permit jurisdiction through
the "unilateral activity" 3 9 of shareholders who choose to reside in the
adopting state, a corporation wishing to insulate its directors from lia-
bility may simply bar the sale of its shares in any such state. 40
131. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977).
132. Id at 216.
133. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978).
134. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985). See Bendix Auto-
lite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988)(implying that
statute deeming corporation's appointment of agent for process to create general
jurisdiction over corporation, including suits in which corporation "did not have
the minimum contacts necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction," not per se
violative of due process). See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S.Ct.
1522 (1991).
135. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
136. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
137. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
138. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
139. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
140. Where a state's adoption of a jurisdictional statute prompts a corporation to dis-
continue the sale of shares there, the fair warning mandated by due process may
require prospective application only. At a minimum, of course, directors placed
on notice that their future negligence may subject them to the jurisdiction of that
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Though perhaps a drastic recourse in some instances, this solution has
precedent in the practice of corporations seeking to avoid the stringent
substantive requirements or burdensome registration procedures of
certain states' blue sky laws.141
b. The Significance of Effects
Even if a statute's jurisdictional authority must rest in part on
some material connection between the director and the forum,142 the
impact of the director's negligence on shareholders in the forum may
well qualify as that link. As noted earlier, the Court in Calder v. Jones
expressly embraced the theory that a state may base jurisdiction over
a corporate employee on the effects that that employee's conduct has
upon residents within that state.143 Insofar as Calder points to an em-
state may avoid liability by stepping down from their positions. Furthermore,
while the corporation cannot bar ownership by residents of an enacting state who
acquired their shares elsewhere, due process may bar jurisdiction based on such
ownership.
141. Whatever issues this burden might present under the commerce clause, see infra
Part IV, it does not appear to raise a serious problem of due process. See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)(corporation unwill-
ing to assume risk of burdensome litigation in state giving "clear notice" of poten-
tial liability there has option of "severing its connection" with the state); see also
Brilmayer, supra note 97, at 95-96. The validity of rooting jurisdiction over direc-
tors in an express statute also draws support from the older case of Pennsylvania
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917). There, the
Court held that if a foreign corporation appoints an agent to receive service of
process pursuant to a state's registration statute, the state may treat the corpora-
tion as having consented to the exercise of general jurisdiction. Id. at 95. While
lower courts have differed over whether Pennsylvania Fire has been superseded
by the modern standard of minimum contacts, see Lea Brilmayer, et aL, A Gen-
eral Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 758-79; Matthew Kipp,
Inferring Express Consent The Paradox of Permitting Registration Statutes to
Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REv. OF LMG. 1 (1990), the principle that statu-
tory registration can confer general jurisdiction even without minimum contacts
appears more consistent with the Court's most recent deferential attitude toward
plausible state exercises of jurisdiction. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604
(1990), for example, not only upheld personal jurisdiction based on service of pro-
cess during the defendant's temporary presence in the state, but also gave indica-
tions that the Court would generally uphold exercises of jurisdiction that fall
short of egregious overreaching. Justice Scalia's opinion announcing the Court's
judgment disavowed independent judicial "inquiry into the desirability or fair-
ness" of the state's rule, id. at 621, and "subjective assessment of what is fair and
just," id. at 623, while Justice Brennan's opinion took pains to reconcile the rule
with traditional notions of fairness. See id. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment).
142. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977)(assumption that Delaware has
important interest in applying its law to corporate fiduciaries does not demon-
strate fairness of Delaware's jurisdiction over nonresident directors).
143. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text. Calder's express approval of the
"effects" test dispelled doubts raised by Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978), about the efficiency of the test. In Kulko, the Court had rejected
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phasis on causal connection between the corporate employee's actions
and the injury felt by the plaintiff in the forum,144 the link between a
director's negligence and shareholder's economic loss can be said to
meet that standard. The concept of causation may provide a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction, at least when it is infused with the notice and
authority that attach to an explicit jurisdictional statute.
An arguable flaw of such a raw causation theory is its failure to
require that the defendant's culpable acts took place inside the forum
state. Several lower court cases have indicated that a corporate fiduci-
ary's susceptibility to jurisdiction depends on whether she has com-
mitted the tort within the forum state.145 This conclusion is bolstered
by the Supreme Court's mention, in rejecting Delaware's assertion of
jurisdiction in Hanson v. Denckla,146 that the cause of action did not
"arise out of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum
state." 47 However, these lower court decisions have generally been
premised on the validity of the fiduciary shield rule.148 Furthermore,
Calder's acceptance of an "effects" test signals that since Hanson the
Court has shifted away from any fixation on the actual site of the
tort's occurrence.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz49 underscores the Court's rejec-
tion of a per se rule that the liability-creating event must literally take
place "within" the forum state. There, the Court upheld Florida's ju-
risdiction in a breach of contract action by Burger King, a Florida cor-
poration, against one of its Michigan franchisees. Rudzewicz's
business activities were more centered in Michigan than the activities
of a typical director of a Delaware corporation are centered in Dela-
ware, and his principal contacts were with Burger King's Michigan of-
fice.150 Burger King, in its broad understanding of how modern
business practices allow a corporate actor to touch another state, dem-
California's attempt to rest jurisdiction in a child custody dispute on the test. Id-
at 96.
144. See Koenig, supra note 72, at 834-37; see also Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. and
Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1988); Alvarado-Morales v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 617 (1st Cir. 1988)("independent, personal involve-
ment" by corporate offices in tortious act required to obtain jurisdiction); L.B.
Indus., Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1987); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg.
Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1985).
145. See, e.g., Western Contracting Corp. v. Bechtel Corp., 885 F.2d 1196, 1200 (4th Cir.
1989); Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 852 (11th
Cir. 1988); Zemen v. Lotus Heart, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 373, 377 (D. Md. 1989); Yankee
Group, Inc. v. Yamashita, 678 F. Supp. 20,23 (D. Mass. 1988); Agra Chem. Distrib.
Co. v. Marion Lab., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 699, 703 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Idaho Potato
Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171, 182 (D. Idaho 1976).
146. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
147. Id at 251.
148. See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text.
149. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
150. See id. at 487 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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onstrates the Court's unwillingness to make jurisdiction hinge on the
adventitious circumstance that the defendant was physically in the fo-
rum state while committing her tortious act.151
Removal of the requirement of a director's earlier involvement
with the forum state could subject directors to liability in numerous
states; thus, the objection that such statutes could excessively burden
directors152 would apply with renewed force. However, insofar as Cal-
der has placed the Court's imprimatur on the "effects" test, the Court
has already tacitly rejected that objection as grounds for an automatic
barrier to jurisdiction. In principle nothing in Calder would preclude
a reporter's or editor's amenability to suit in every state at which she
had "expressly aimed" 15 3 her allegedly libelous statement. Moreover,
it is by no means clear that even the widespread adoption of statutes
providing for express consent to jurisdiction would inevitably mean
that directors would have to defend at multiple trials. A nationwide
class action might well be brought in a single consolidated proceeding,
or at least principles res judicata and collateral estoppel might operate
to avoid retrial of matters already litigated. In any event, to the ex-
tent that direct actions against directors are typically joined with de-
rivative suits in which the corporation is a nominal defendant, any
practical unfairness to the defendant director is substantially reduced;
the director's presence may be necessary anyway to testify on behalf
151. Moreover, the state's interest in seeing resident shareholders compensated for
wrongful economic injury, while not dispositive, see supra note 142 and accompa-
nying text, is certainly relevant to the issue of jurisdiction. In an early instance of
the modern expansion of jurisdiction, the Court cited California's "manifest in-
terest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers
refuse to pay claims." McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957)(upholding California court's jurisdiction over Texas life insurance com-
pany in suit by California beneficiary to recover benefits on company's policy
with California resident). Even where the plaintiff was a nonresident, see Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984)(New York resident bringing
suit in New Hampshire, in which fraction of copies of defendant's magazine were
circulated), and where consideration of another state's sovereignty might have
been implicated, see Nevada v. Hall, 44 U.S. 410, 424 (1979)(suit arising out of
automobile collision in California brought in California court against, inter alia,
the state of Nevada), the Court has sustained jurisdiction, in part by taking cogni-
zance of the forum's interest in redressing injuries experienced within the state.
Assignment of significant weight to this type of interest is buttressed by the
Court's suggestions of an increasing role for the plaintiffs interests in determin-
ing jurisdiction. See Pamela J. Stephens, The Single Contract as Minimum Con-
tacts. Justice Brennan "Has it His Way," 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 89 (1986); see
also Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied.- Overhauling Con-
stitutional Theory, 59 U. CoLo. L. REv. 67, 102 (1988)(need for constitutional pro-
tections from plaintiff's choice of forum diminished by availability of forum
nonconveniens and constitutional review of choice of law).
152. This objection was considered earlier. See supra notes 115-125 and accompanying
text.
153. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
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of the corporation, over which the state has undisputed jurisdiction.'5 4
Nor are all the equities piled on the director's side of the scale.
Major transactions such as a merger or tender offer often personally
enrich the transgressing directors, either through "golden
parachutes"L5 5 or by directors' membership in the class of sharehold-
ers for whose alleged benefit the transaction took place. They thus
"purposefully derive benefit"5 6 from their conduct that impacts resi-
dents of the forum state; they have "reach[ed] out beyond"' 5 7 the state
where the corporation is chartered or where its directors meet to take
personal advantage of the interstate market for the corporation's
shares. In the forum's eyes, at least, it would be inaccurate to assert
that such directors have had "nothing to do with"158 the state or its
residents.
c. Theories of Attribution
To some extent, perhaps, the ability of a forum to exert jurisdiction
over a director when it is the corporation that has had visible prior
involvement with the state may rest upon notions of derivative juris-
diction. Rather than isolating a director's relationship with the forum
state, a more realistic perspective might examine the director's and
corporation's joint impact on the state. The device of obtaining juris-
diction over corporations and corporate personnel through agency' 59
or other theories of attribution60 is hardly a radical innovation; even
conspiracy theory has been invoked to assert jurisdiction over an ab-
sent defendant in corporate litigation.16' While the Supreme Court
has stated that "jurisdiction over an employee does not automatically
follow from jurisdiction over the corporation which employs him,"162
154. See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 201 (Ct. App. 1988).
155. E.g., Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 232-35 (S.D. Ohio), affid
mere., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987).
156. Kulko v. California Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978); see Marine Midland Bank,
N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1981)(fiduciary shield doctrine inapplica-
ble where corporate employee acts "in his own personal interest").
157. Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950).
158. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
159. See Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd. 385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 996 (1967); Odell v. Signer, 169 So. 2d 851,853-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
cert discharged, 176 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1965).
160. See Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive
Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1986).
161. E.g., Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group Ltd., 782 F. Supp. 215, 220-23 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Hart Holding Co., Inc. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 593 A.2d 535, 542
(Del. 1991); Instituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g. Co., Inc., 449 A.2d 210,
222-25 (Del. 1982); see also Stuart M. Riback, Note, The Long Arm and Multiple
Defendants: The Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 84 CoLUM. L.
REv. 506 (1984).
162. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984).
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that observation does not preclude narrowly tailored statutory invoca-
tion of derivative jurisdiction. Although doctrines of principal-agent
are ordinarily used to hold the principal responsible for the agent's
misconduct, the agent herself is generally not relieved of liability.163
In the context of board approval of major transactions, the practi-
cal identity between the decision of the directors and the act of the
corporation should permit a state to assert jurisdiction over directors
partly on the basis of their relationship with the corporation.
Whatever purposes are served by ordinary respect for the independent
corporate personality, that rule has never been elevated to an absolute
principle. Just as the common law has allowed plaintiffs to pierce the
corporate veil when demanded by fairness and realism,164 so should a
state be entitled to act on the reality that it is identifiable individuals,
and not simply an abstraction, whose negligence has harmed the
state's residents. The Court in Calder, by allowing a California court
to try the individual perpetrators of the magazines's alleged libel, in
effect recognized that some corporate actions are peculiarly inter-
twined with the conduct of particular agents. Moreover, given the
prominent power and responsibilities of the board, and the narrow
scope of the proposed statute, permitting state courts to try nonresi-
dent directors for alleged negligence in major transactions will not
open the door to unlimited jurisdiction over a vast range of corporate
employees.
Finally, it should be noted that in the larger perspective of modern
jurisdiction doctrine, the proposal here does not represent a theoreti-
cal quantum leap. Jurisdiction over a director in these special circum-
stances would be as logical and no more unprecedented than was
International Shoe's abandonment of Pennoyer's strict territorialism
or McGee's basing jurisdiction on a single insurance contract.165 The
Court's refusal to be shackled by "[m]echanical or quantitative evalua-
tions"166 in determining jurisdiction, its intention to weigh a broad
range of factors,167 and an emerging sentiment that the validity of
changes in jurisdictional rules depends on whether they are "adopted
as progressive by the American people" rather than "decreed as pro-
gressive by the Justices of this Court"168 all point to a willingness to
tolerate forms of jurisdiction that can be sensibly justified rather than
a rejection of them simply because they are innovative.
163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
164. See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations 841-860 (1985).
165. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
166. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
167. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985); see supra notes
51-52 and accompanying text.
168. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 627 (1990)(Scalia, J., announcing
judgment).
[Vol. 72:1
SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS
3. No Prior Independent Contacts by Either Corporation or
Director
Jurisdiction over directors grounded starkly in the simple presence
of shareholders in the forum state may seem a far-fetched idea, and it
must be conceded that few courts or legislatures would venture at
present to consider such jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the principal ra-
tionales just recited for upholding jurisdiction over directors where
the forum already has general jurisdiction over the corporation-the
sufficiency of statutory notice and the "effects" test--also support
reaching a director regardless of her corporation's prior presence in
the state. On the one hand, there is a major difference between the
two cases: the inability to bootstrap jurisdiction over the director onto
any shareholder grievance against the corporation itself. On the other
hand, there is something intuitively jarring about hinging the availa-
bility of suit against an allegedly negligent director on the fortuity
that her corporation does business in the forum state. However, the
debate on jurisdiction in this context is truly academic, because the
multistate character of the class action proposed here may make it un-
necessary, as a practical matter, to resort to suit in a state where
neither the corporation nor its directors have had prior involvement.
The authority for and mechanics of such multistate actions are dis-
cussed in the following section.
C. Shutts and Jurisdiction in Class Actions
Any discussion of the feasibility of multistate class actions war-
rants an examination of the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Pe-
troleum Company v. Shutts.169 Shutts demonstrates that bringing a
claim against directors through this type of suit raises special jurisdic-
tional questions, especially with regard to the plaintiff's latitude in
choosing a forum. For example, it may seem incongruous to bring suit
in a state in which relatively few shareholders live if many more
shareholders are concentrated in another state. If the plaintiff selects
a forum based on the stringency of the state's negligence standard,
that choice will undoubtedly incur the familiar and opprobrious
charge of forum shopping. Prior to Shutts, these concerns might have
posed difficult problems for jurisdiction outside the state where the
corporation is chartered, where its principal place of business is lo-
cated, or where the largest number of its shareholders reside. The
Court's reasoning in Shutts, however, substantially diminishes the
likelihood that class action plaintiffs who otherwise establish a sub-
stantial connection between a defendant director and the forum will
encounter serious constitutional obstacles to jurisdiction.
Shutts upheld Kansas jurisdiction in a class action brought by own-
169. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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ers of royalty rights to leases of land from which Phillips, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, produced
natural gas.170 Most notably, the Court rejected Phillips's contention
that valid jurisdiction required that nonresident royalty owners pos-
sess minimum contacts with Kansas.171 Rather, the Court held that
due process is satisfied when absent class members are notified of the
action, given a chance to be heard and to participate, and granted an
opportunity to exclude themselves from the class by returning a com-
pleted "opt out" form to the court.172 The Court specifically refused
to place on plaintiffs the burden of "opting in" to the class.173
Shutts appears to foreclose most colorable constitutional claims
that an otherwise sufficient forum is not suited to host a class action.
Only a small portion of the royalty owners1 74 in Shutts (as well as a
concededly "miniscule" number of gas leases) 75 had any significant
connection with the forum state. As long as Phillips had substantial
contacts with Kansas, however-a matter not in serious dispute' 76 -
the greater magnitude of contacts elsewhere did not defeat jurisdic-
tion. Shutts thus suggests that due process does not bar shareholders
from maintaining a class action in a state where only a small propor-
tion of the plaintiff class resides.
The Shutts Court also appeared untroubled by the plaintiffs' selec-
tion of a Kansas court in the obvious hope that it would provide an
exceptionally hospitable forum for their claims. Indeed, it would have
been incongruous for the Court to have condemned the plaintiffs'
strategy after it had so recently placed its imprimatur on a far more
blatant form of forum shopping in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.7 7
Keeton upheld New Hampshire's jurisdiction in a libel suit by a New
York resident against an Ohio corporation which had its principal
place of business in California. 7 8 The Court openly acknowledged
and condoned the plaintiff's strategy of exploiting New Hampshire's
favorable statute of limitations.179 In addition, the New Hampshire
courts were permitted to apply the "single publication rule," using
New Hampshire law to award the plaintiff damages resulting from the
national dissemination of the allegedly libelous material even though
170. Id. at 799.
171. Id. at 811.
172. Id. at 812.
173. Id.
174. See id at 814-16.
175. Id. at 801; see id. at 814-16. Nor was ownership of the leases evenly distributed in
small amounts among a large number of states; over half of the leases and royalty
owners were in Texas. Id. at 816.
176. See Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 567 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1977), cert denied, 434
U.S. 1068 (1978); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985).
177. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
178. Id. at 772.
179. Id. at 778-79.
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only a fraction of the copies of the defendant's magazine were sold in
New Hampshire. 8 0 In Shutts, by contrast, the impact of Kansas law
was far more limited; Kansas was forbidden to apply its law to deter-
mine the rights of royalty owners whose leases did not have a signifi-
cant connection with the state.18 1
Certainly shareholder direct actions differ from the royalty own-
ers' claims in Shutts, but these differences do not appear to justify de-
priving shareholders of the expansive jurisdiction in class actions that
Shutts recognized. For example, legitimate concerns may exist over a
forum's ability to accurately apply other states' corporate rules, but
these concerns raise issues of choice of law rather than constitutional
barriers to personal jurisdiction. 8 2 Likewise, although the nature of
some shareholder class actions may support a more limited opt out
right than was granted in Shutts,183 this consideration does not inter-
fere with the exercise of jurisdiction. It is possible, too, that the tradi-
tional opprobrium attached to forum shopping 8 4 may apply with
heightened severity to shareholder attempts to bring their suit in an
optimal forum; however, Shutt's tacit dismissal of this motive as a dis-
qualifying factor is sweeping enough to encompass class actions by
shareholders as well as by royalty owners. Indeed, shareholder forum
shopping to maximize directors' accountability for negligent behavior
may well be viewed as the flip-side to director shopping for permissive
states of incorporation to minimize that accountability. The accepted
legitimacy of such director behavior seems to require a recognition of
the legitimacy of shareholder forum shopping. Finally, though it may
be overstatement to say that Shutts "eliminated all constitutional bar-
riers to personal jurisdiction" in small claim, multistate class ac-
tions, 8 5 the sympathy signaled by the Court for the practicability of
class actionsL8 6 does not seem likely to stop at royalty owners' suits.
180. Id. at 773-74.
181. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-23 (1985).
182. Id, at 821.
183. See In re Mobile Communications Corp. of America, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,558 (Del. Ch. 1991).
184. But see Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677
(1990)(many activities characterized as "forum shopping" are not necessarily
blameworthy).
185. John E. Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride of Frankenstein: Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34 KAN. L. REV.
255, 302 (1985).
186. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809-14 (1985).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW
IN A SUIT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES:
THE LENIENT PARAMETERS OF THE
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
Once jurisdiction is established, the constitutional entitlement of a
state to apply its law to breaches of fiduciary duties against its resi-
dents appears to fall within the generous boundaries of the full faith
and credit clause.187 A series of older Supreme Court cases did cast
doubt on the ability of a forum state to refuse to follow any aspect of
the corporate regime created by the state in which a foreign corpora-
tion was chartered (lex incorporationis). However, even as the Court
let those earlier pronouncements stand, it diluted the rigidity of lex
incorporationis in other holdings under the full faith and credit and
due process clauses. Finally, the Court's 1981 decision in Allstate In-
surance Company v. Hague,lSS although not directly addressing the
issue of lex incorporationis, made clear that the full faith and credit
clause provided meager restraint on the forum state's application of its
law. Four years later, Shutts indicated that a forum state could also
apply other states' laws in the type of multistate class action proposed
here.
A. The Constitutional Philosophy of Choice of Law
The determination of whether a forum may apply fiduciary stan-
dards other than those of the state of incorporation must be guided by
full faith and credit's basic requirement that the choice of law be
neither "arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 8 9 A court must weigh
the state's interest in applying its own fiduciary rules against any need
for national uniformity in the resolution of disputes over directors' du-
ties of due care.190 This calculus reflects full faith and credit's attempt
to balance the prerogatives of state sovereignty with the necessity that
states "coexist in relative harmony." 191 By vindicating legitimate reli-
ance on a state's statutes and case law, the full faith and credit clause
supplies a substantial measure of the predictability necessary to ra-
tional planning in a nation of multiple legal regimes.192 At the same
187. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The clause provides in part: "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceeding of
every other State." For an account of the origins of the clause, see Douglas Lay-
cock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Founda-
tions of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 288-310 (1992).
188. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)(plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
189. 1d. at 313 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
190. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
191. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in
Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 150 (1976).
192. See Arthur von Mehran & Donald T. Trautman, Constitutional Control of Choice
of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 56 (1981); see also
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time, the command of the clause is far from absolute; "[n]othing in the
Constitution insures unlimited extraterritorial recognition of all stat-
utes or of any statute under all circumstances."193 Where enforce-
ment of another state's law would interfere with an important policy
of the forum state, it need not defer to the offensive statute. 94
Many of the Court's rulings on the scope of the full faith and credit
clause have also considered the limitations on choice of law imposed
by due process. These two constitutional limitations ostensibly ad-
dress different theoretical concerns. 95 While full faith and credit is
designed to restrain the centrifugal forces of federalism, due process
aims to prevent unfair surprise to parties who have no reasonable ex-
pectation that they would be subjected to the forum state's law.196 In
practice, however, the Court has tended to meld these two distinct
purposes into a single overarching inquiry into the reasonableness of
the forum's application of its own law.197 Even if a material distinc-
tion between the two protections were to be preserved, full faith and
credit has traditionally been viewed as imposing a more stringent re-
striction than due process on a forum's choice of law.198 Accordingly,
if application of the forum state's fiduciary standard comports with
the requirements of full faith and credit, it satisfies due process as
well.
B. The Decline of the Internal Affairs Rule Prior to Allstate
Allstate purported to draw from, rather than supplant, the full
faith and credit jurisprudence that had earlier evolved. 99 A number
of prior decisions appeared to endorse a presumption that any devia-
tion from lex incorporationis, such as this article's application of the
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935)(full faith and credit clause largely
abolishing general principle in international law by which "local policy is permit-
ted to dominate rules of comity").
193. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941).
194. See id.; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501-02
(1939).
195. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320-23 (1981)(Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment).
196. See id. at 327; Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limi-
tations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IoWA L. REv. 449, 457-60 (1959); see also
Kirgis, supra note 197, at 99-107.
197. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J); id. at 332 (Pow-
ell, J. dissenting); id. at 321 nn. 5-6 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 305 n.13 (Mich. 1987).
198. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 1139; Weintraub, supra note 196, at 468;
see also Weinberg, supra note 151, at 76 ("[m]inimal scrutiny" given to choice of
law under due process clause).
199. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307-13 (plurality opinion of Brennan,
J.).
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forum's fiduciary rule, presumptively exceeds the constitutional limi-
tations on a state's ability to apply its own law. In light of other deci-
sions handed down before Allstate, however, this tacit "internal affairs
doctrine" 200 can be understood as having already been largely con-
fined to the specific type of setting in which it was most frequently
promulgated.
The principal authority for an unyielding constitutional insistence
on the primacy of lex incorporationis is a series of cases involving fra-
ternal benefit societies. The Court has consistently held that the
terms of membership in such a society were to be governed by the
laws of the state in which the society was domiciled.201 These deci-
sions elevated to constitutional doctrine the philosophy that "predict-
ability, practicality, and equality call for both corporate governance
and the common rights and obligations of the [members] to be subject
to a single law."202 The series culminated in Order of United Commer-
cial Travelers of America v. Wolfe,203 in which the Court barred a
forum state's award of benefits in violation of a fraternal benefit soci-
ety's constitution. Holding that the forum state must defer to the state
laws under which the society was created, the Court summarized prior
decisions as "unwaveringly safeguard[ing], in each state, the effective-
ness of the public acts of every other state."204
Well before Allstate the fraternal society cases were recognized as
aberrant in their categorical sanction of the law of the corporate domi-
cile. Currie criticized the reasoning of the cases, 205 and other com-
mentators grew skeptical of their precedential value.206 Seventeen
years after Wolfe the Supreme Court characterized its holding as "a
highly specialized decision dealing with unique facts."2 07 This state-
ment, along with other developments, signaled that the fraternal soci-
ety cases would not block the application of the lex fori to
corporations. 208
Cases outside the area of fraternal benefit societies suggested a pre-
sumption of allowing the forum state to pursue its legitimate interests
200. See supra Part V-B.
201. E.g., Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938);
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925).
202. P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 34; see
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925) (referring to "in-
divisible unity between the members of a corporation of this kind in respect of
the fund from which their rights are to be enforced, and the consequence that
rights must be determined by a single law").
203. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
204. Id. at 609; see Kirgis, supra note 191, at 120, 126-27.
205. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 243 (1963).
206. See, e.g., Reese & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 1131 n. 53.
207. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964).
208. See Stanley A. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21
VAND. L. REV. 433, 446 (1968).
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by applying its laws, even if the litigants had entered into their con-
tractual relationship in another state. Supreme Court decisions ad-
dressing choice of law in workers' compensation provide a conspicuous
example of this approach. As early as 1939, the Court held that the
full faith and credit clause did not prevent a state in which an accident
had occurred from applying its own workers' compensation law rather
than that of the state in which the employment relationship was
formed.209 The significance of contacts with the forum state came 21 0
to play a similar role in the applicability of the forum's law to private
insurance policies, 21i as the Court embraced the principle that full
faith and credit "does not automatically compel a state to subordinate
its own contract laws to the laws of another state in which a contract
happens to have been executed."21 2
Even relying only on pre-Allstate jurisprudence, then, a proponent
of legislation subjecting directors of foreign corporations to the fiduci-
ary standards of the forum could cogently argue the Court's rejection
of the central feature of Wolfe: an undifferentiated view of the fo-
rum's obligation to abide by every aspect of the lex incorporationis.213
Beyond the particular results in the workers' compensation and insur-
ance cases, a larger strain of full faith and credit doctrine had author-
209. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). Pa-
cific Employers began the gradual abandonment of Bradford Elec. Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), which had apparently construed the full faith and
credit clause as presumptively demanding the application of the worker's com-
pensation statute of the state in which the employment relation was rooted.
Later cases permitted the forum to "supplement" or "displace," Carroll v. Lanza,
349 U.S. 408, 414 (1955), the remedy provided by the workers' compensation act of
another state as long as the forum state could claim a "substantial connection,"
Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469,476 (1947), with the relationship
between the employer and the employee. Even if a state makes its benefits
scheme exclusive, the full faith and credit clause confers on neither the state
where the employment relationship originated, Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408,
412, nor the state where the injury occurred, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980), an absolute power to dictate the compensation policy of a
forum with the requisite "connection."
210. An older case, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924), had flatly pro-
hibited the forum from applying its own law to a life insurance policy issued in
another state.
211. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
212. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954).
213. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586,
(1947):
It is of the essence of the full faith and credit clause that, if a state gives
some faith and credit to the public acts of another state by permitting its
own citizens to become members of, and benefit from fraternal benefit
societies organized by such other state, then it must give full faith and
credit to those public acts and must recognize the burdens and limita-
tions which are inherent in such memberships.
dE at 625.
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ized departures from lex loci contractus if its enforcement would
infringe upon the public policy of the forum state.2 1 4 More broadly,
commentators discerned in the Court's rulings the principle that
"[w]hen a state has a policy of its own, and when the state's connection
with a case is such as to constitute a reasonable and substantial basis
for the state's assertion of an interest in applying its policy, neither the
Full Faith and Credit Clause nor the Due Process Clause requires it to
apply the law of another state in preference to its own."215
Although special considerations of corporate governance may
counsel stricter adherence to the lex incorporationis than in the ordi-
nary contractual relationship,216 developments in the corporate field
conversely have militated against imposing strict full faith and credit
constraints on the prerogatives of the forum state. Prior to Allstate
the most direct affront to the primacy of the state of incorporation was
the 1977 passage of section 2115 of the California Corporation Code.217
That legislation applies much of California law to foreign corporations
whose contacts, as gauged by stockholding and business, are predomi-
nantly with California. The legislation represented the culmination of
efforts to subject "pseudo-foreign" corporations to the laws of the
state with which they are principally involved.2 ' 8 A number of cases
had already applied the forum state's law to such corporations.21 9 Sec-
tion 2115 codified an emerging sense that there is nothing intrinsically
sacrosanct or supreme about the lex incorporationis if the forum state
can cite substantial interests in applying its law. Whatever colorable
objections might be raised under conflicts principles220 or the com-
merce clause,22 ' the Court's holding a few years later in Allstate con-
firmed that the full faith and credit clause reins are loose indeed.
C. Allstate and the Permissive Test of "Minimum Contacts"
Allstate dispelled any doubts about the latitude afforded by the
older full faith and credit cases. Although the decision did not directly
involve corporate choice of law, its logic extends to that area. A state's
interest in protecting its resident investors through the application of
214. See, e.g., Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 506-07 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941); Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 21 (1917).
215. B. CURRIE, supra note 205, at 162; i&L at 271 (choice of law violative of full faith
and credit or due process "only when the state whose law is applied has no legiti-
mate interest in its application").
216. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
217. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977).
218. See Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
219. E.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959)(per
curiam); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961).
220. See infra part V.
221. See infra part IV.
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its fiduciary standards fits comfortably within the type of interest to
which the Court gave deference in Allstate.
The Allstate plaintiff was the widow of a Wisconsin resident who
had commuted to work in Minnesota. The husband had died after an
automobile struck the motorcycle on which he was a passenger; the
accident took place in Wisconsin. After the accident, the plaintiff be-
came a resident of Minnesota. Since the driver of neither the car nor
the motorcycle carried valid insurance, the plaintiff, as representative
of her deceased husband's estate, sought to recover on an uninsured
motorist clause in his insurance policy. The policy covered three
automobiles and was limited to $15,000 for each one. Wisconsin law
would have authorized the plaintiff to recover only the amount pro-
vided for one of the automobiles, whereas Minnesota permitted
"stacking" of the three coverages to produce a $45,000 recovery. The
plaintiff brought suit in Minnesota, and the Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's application of Minnesota law to allow the
larger recovery.222 The Supreme Court affirmed.
Canvassing the Court's earlier decisions under the full faith and
credit and due process clauses, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion ex-
tracted the principle that a state's valid selection of its own law re-
quires that the state have "a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor unfair."223 Here, Minnesota could subject
Allstate to its stacking law on the basis of an "aggregate" of three con-
tacts: the decedent's fifteen years of employment in Minnesota, All-
state's presence and conduct of business in the state, and the plaintiff's
status as a Minnesota resident and representative of her late hus-
band's estate.224 Each contact in turn generated an interest that sup-
ported Minnesota's application of its own law: for example, fulfilling
the state's "police power responsibilities" to members of its
workforce.225
Both the immediate result and the general tenor of Allstate gave
considerable momentum to attempts by forum states to apply their
law to activities having a discernible impact within the state. Allstate
signaled minimal constitutional restraint on choice of law.226 Refus-
222. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hauge, 449 U.S. 302, 305-07 (1981)(Brennan, J., plurality).
223. 1d at 312-13.
224. Id at 313-19.
225. Id at 314.
226. In addition to the permissive reasoning of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion,
Justice Stevens provided the fifth vote in the 5-3 decision. His concurrence in the
judgment took a similarly lenient view of the restraints imposed by the full faith
and credit and due process clauses. See id. at 320-332; see generally, e.g., Sympo-
sium: Conjlict-of-Laws Theory After Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1 (1981).
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ing "blindly" to follow "wooden" choice-of-law rules,227 the plurality
indulged the broad meaning that Minnesota gave to its connection
with the parties and their dispute.228 Older decisions forbidding states
to apply their law to insurance policies were dismissed as "extreme"
instances of a forum's choosing its law and hence were deemed irrele-
vant to Minnesota's more extensive contact with the parties and con-
troversy in Allstate.229 Critics of the decision quickly recognized its
effective announcement of the Court's deep reluctance to intrude on
states' choice of law.230 Agreeing at least on this interpretation of All-
state's thrust, approving observers welcomed the Court's apparent re-
nunciation of close choice-of-law supervision as a "supremely
sensible"231 step.
Allstate's overall laissez-faire approach to choice of law lends sup-
port to a state's application of its fiduciary standards to protect its resi-
dent investors. The plurality assumed that a state's interest in
members of its workforce is less than its interest in its residents, yet
still deemed the decedent's employment by a Minnesota company a
"very important" contact.2 32 Therefore, a fiduciary statute aimed di-
rectly at protecting residents would also implicate a sufficiently
weighty interest. Moreover, the plurality took an expansive view of
the state's interest in compensation of its residents. For example, the
Court acknowledged Minnesota's interest in keeping " 'resident acci-
dent victims' ... 'off welfare rolls' and able to meet 'financial obliga-
tions.' "233 These same types of economic concerns extend to
shareholders who have suffered financial loss from the misconduct of
directors. The plurality was similarly willing to entertain a liberal, if
somewhat vague, theory of the broader impact of Allstate's compensa-
tion policies within Minnesota, stating that a state's workforce is
227. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 316 n.22 (1981).
228. See id. at 314.
229. Id. at 311. The plurality's two examples were John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) and Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
230. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between
State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1315, 1341-47 (1981); Alfred Hill, Choice
of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1981); P.
John Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of
Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 889 (1981); Linda Silberman, Can the State of Minne-
sota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-law Constraints After Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103 (1981); von Mehran & Trautman,
supra note 192, at 43.
231. Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law: A Dismal Prospect, 14 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 907, 915-17 (1981); see Robert A.
Leflar, Choice of Law: States' Rights, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 203 (1981); Courtland
H. Peterson, Particularism in the Conflict of Laws, 10 HoFsTRA L. REV. 973
(1981); Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
440 (1982).
232. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1981).
233. Id. at 319 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978)).
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"surely affected by the level of protection the State extends to it,
either directly or indirectly."234 Likewise, a state's investors are
"surely affected" by the level of protection that they receive from the
state through its regulation of fiduciary obligations.
One of the toughest criticisms of Allstate challenges the outcome
because none of Allstate's prior involvement with Minnesota related
to the claim brought by the plaintiff; by merely doing business in Min-
nesota, Allstate exposed itself to the imposition of unrelated Minne-
sota law.235 Under this approach, if a director's contacts with a forum
state are sufficient to support jurisdiction,2 36 they could be comforta-
bly aggregated with the state's interest in protecting resident share-
holders in order to sustain the application of forum law. Moreover,
the explicit fiduciary regulation proposed here would avoid the only
real evil allegedly inflicted by the Allstate outcome: unfair surprise.237
By expressly announcing an intention to apply forum law to directors
of foreign corporations, a state would provide a degree of notice lack-
ing, and yet not fatal, in Allstate.238
The imposition of forum fiduciary law on directors of foreign cor-
porations does involve a countervailing factor not present in Allstate:
the assertion by another state of a putatively superior interest in the
exclusive application of its law. Again, though, however powerful the
presumption in favor of lex incorporationis may be as a principle of
conflicts law, there is nothing in Allstate to suggest that it rises to the
level of constitutional doctrine. On the contrary, the plurality's rejec-
tion of "wooden" rules, its recognition that full faith and credit often
permits the application of more than a single state's law,23 9 and its
disavowal of a weighing-of-interests approach 240 all point toward ac-
ceptance of the forum state's application of its fiduciary standard
where that application is "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair."241
The resistance of California's section 2115 to full faith and credit
challenges in the wake of Allstatem2 supports this conclusion. In an
important sense the proposed fiduciary rule is much more limited
234. Id at 315.
235. See Kozyris, supra note 230, at 902.
236. See supra part II.
237. See Hill, supra note 230, at 968; Kozyris, supra note 230, at 900; von Mehran &
Trautman, supra note 192, at 52-53.
238. But see Brilmayer, supra note 230, at 1317, 1324 (state policy preferring applica-
tion of forum law in multistate setting not constitutionally entitled to deference).
239. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981).
240. Id- at 308 n.10.
241. Id at 313.
242. See, e.g., Valtz v. Penta Investment Corp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 803 (DCA 4 1983)(ap-
plication of California law governing disclosure of shareholder lists); Wilson v.
Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216 (DCA 2 1983)(requirement
of cumulative voting).
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than the scope of section 2115. Unlike the far-reaching provisions of
section 2115, this article's proposal touches on only one facet of a cor-
poration's governance. Moreover, the proposed treatment of that
facet does not inherently override a divergent law of the state of domi-
cile, and it is therefore consistent with Allstate's tolerant philosophy of
permitting some issues to be subject to resolution by the laws of more
than one state. While an overarching need for uniformity arguably
may dictate that a single law apply to matters such as shareholders'
voting rights243 and the formation of corporations, 244 no such necessity
extends to fiduciary obligations. The viability of having different fidu-
ciary obligations to shareholders in various states leads this article in a
later section to conclude that the proposal here is valid even under
principles of conflicts law;245 if that is true, then it follows that the
proposal falls well within the more capacious boundaries that Allstate
established for the full faith and credit clause.
D. Shutts and Choice of Law in Class Actions
While full faith and credit thus appears to permit a forum state's
application of its fiduciary laws, questions remain about the particular
restraints that might be imposed on the specific vehicle of a sharehold-
ers' multistate class action. The Supreme Court's decision in Shutts
placed restrictions on the ability to apply forum law to transactions
with which the forum state has a relatively slight connection. Never-
theless, the Court also upheld the basic mechanism of the multistate
class action, as long as the forum state recognizes those instances in
which the law of another state should prevail. 246
While Shutts struck down Kansas courts' selection of law in a mul-
243. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 314 P.2d 62, 65 (DCA 1
Cal. 1957); Kirgis, supra note 191, at 139; but see Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Re-
sources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216 (DCA 2 1983).
244. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 212, at 1133.
245. See infra part V.
246. Shutts invalidated the Kansas courts' resolution of most of the substantive claims
involved not simply because the class action reached beyond Kansas's border, but
rather because the courts overreached in their choice of law. Only about three
percent of the plaintiffs and fewer than one percent of the leases could be fairly
characterized as having a substantial connection with Kansas. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-15 (1985). Under these circumstances, it was im-
proper for Kansas to apply its own law across-the-board in ruling on the disputed
royalty payments. However "modest," ic- at 818, the restrictions placed by All-
state on choice of law, the plurality opinion there did not leave defendants help-
less in the face of forum aggrandizement. Thus, Kansas's lack of " 'interest'" in
the out-of-state transactions made the application of its law to those transactions
impermissibly "arbitrary and unfair." Id. at 821-22 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)). Although the Court declined to state pre-
cisely which law must be applied to each of the transactions involved in Shutts,
i&i at 823, the Kansas Supreme Court on remand apparently proceeded on the
premise that the law of the state in which the lease was held would govern. See
[Vol. 72:1
SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS
tistate class action, the Court made clear that it was not rejecting the
procedural device itself. On the contrary, the Court simply acknowl-
edged that compliance with full faith and credit requirements may en-
tail special difficulties and burdens when managing a class action
involving many transactions and the laws of several states.247 Thus,
any reservations about the practical obstacles to implementation of a
multistate class action lie in the realm of policy debate; they do not
detract from the Court's approval of a properly administered action.
States can tailor their shareholder actions to avoid the defects on
which the suit in Shutts foundered. Kansas not only lacked a signifi-
cant connection with most of the leases at issue in Shutts, but its law
directly conflicted with the laws of states possessing such a connec-
tion.248 By contrast, the statute proposed here would pointedly limit
the reach of forum law to directors' liability toward shareholders who
are residents of the forum state; liability to out-of-state shareholders
would be governed by the laws of their respective states. Where the
law of another state would relieve the defendant directors of liabil-
ity-either because of more relaxed fiduciary standards or deference
to the state of incorporation-the class members residing in that state
would not recover. This compartmentalization by plaintiffs' state of
residence appears to be what the Shutts Court had in mind when it
differentiated between Phillips Petroleum's ostensible liability to
Kansas shareholders and the possibility of the company's being ex-
cused from payment to leaseholders in Texas and Oklahoma.2 49
Admittedly, the application of forum law to the internal relations
of a foreign corporation may bring the forum state into conflict with
the state of domicile. A clash becomes almost inevitable if the state of
incorporation wishes to have its law govern all of the directors' fiduci-
ary obligations, and such a clash Would undoubtedly threaten applica-
tion of forum law under orthodox conflicts theory.25 0 As a
constitutional matter, however, the problem is the extreme deference
given to the lex incorporationis, which assumes a supremacy by the
state of domicile that the modern thrust of full faith and credit doc-
trine has relinquished. It is one thing to say that Kansas may not im-
pose its law on transactions that are rooted in another state and devoid
of links to Kansas. It would be erroneous, though, to read Shutts and
Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 732 P.2d 1286 (Kan. 1987), cert, denied, 487 U.S.
1223 (1988).
247. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985). Since Shutts, com-
mentators have identified more particularly some of the problems that this type
of suit may engender. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986).
248. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816-18 (1985).
249. See id.
250. See infra notes 332-94 and accompanying text.
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Allstate as denying to a state the power to protect its own residents
from economic harm originating elsewhere. Nor is a state deprived of
that power simply because the harm has been inflicted through the
apparatus of a corporation.
Finally, the role that unfair surprise played in the decision to over-
turn Kansas's choice of law indicates that the proposed fiduciary stat-
ute would be viewed in a different light from the claim in Shutts. The
Shutts Court noted that the parties to leases involving land and roy-
alty owners outside of Kansas would not have expected that their obli-
gations would be governed by Kansas law.251 As in the case of
jurisdiction,252 however, an explicit outreach statute grounded in a le-
gitimate state interest would give clear notice of the state's intention
to hold directors accountable to the forum state's heightened duty of
care.
2 5 3
IV. COMMERCE CLAUSE PROHIBITIONS: BURDENS,
DISCRIMINATION, AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The commerce clause provides a more powerful constraint than
full faith and credit on a state's ability to regulate the behavior of di-
rectors of foreign corporations. The fundamental objection to the pro-
posed fiduciary statute lies in its potential to disrupt orderly corporate
planning. The internal affairs of corporations, it is said, should be
"subjected to a unitary, cohesive, consistent, predictable, equal, and
continuous regime of regulation." 25 4 Accordingly, the imposition of
disparate state regulations could interfere to an unreasonable degree
251. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
252. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
253. Perhaps the most difficult and complex questions that Shutts raises for the pro-
posed statute pertain to the res judicata effect of a judgment in a shareholder
class action. One of the principal underpinnings of the rule of res judicata-
shielding the defendant from vexatious lawsuits, see, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL
Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 615 (1985)(most important purpose of res judicata is to
"provide repose for both the party litigants and the public"), takes on a special
focus in the corporate setting. Subjecting directors to several suits for the same
conduct, perhaps with officers summoned as witnesses, threatens serious disrup-
tion of corporate operations. See Note, Res Judicata in the Derivative Action"
Adequacy of Representation and the Inadequate Plaintiff, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1042,
1058 (1973). In the case of adoption by numerous states of the statute proposed
here, such disruption might result from competing or successive shareholder
class actions. Shutts does not altogether preclude the possibility of such actions;
while the Court endorsed the defendant's interest in having the entire plaintiff
class bound by res judicata, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985), the opinion did not promulgate a firm rule for claim preclusion. See
Miller & Crump, supra note 247, at 36. Ultimately, however, the special danger
of multiple suits posed by shareholder multistate class actions is probably more
theoretical than real. For an excellent analysis of concerns about multistate class
actions left in the aftermath of Shutts, see Miller & Crump, supra note 247.
254. P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate Take-
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with the free flow of commerce protected by the commerce clause.25 5
In this view, diverse fiduciary duties would impede the commerce
clause goal of facilitating multistate commercial transactions.256
However plausible concerns over expediting economic activity may
be, they are more significant to economic than constitutional the-
ory.257 In finding that Congress's power to regulate interstate com-
merce implies limitations on states' ability to affect that commerce, 258
the Supreme Court's overriding purpose has been to counter state pro-
tectionism.259 If state legislation expressly discriminates against out-
of-state commerce, the Court inspects the statute skeptically and al-
most invariably strikes down this manifestation of protectionism.260 A
similar level of scrutiny invalidates state statutes that seek to control
commerce that takes place entirely outside the boundaries of the
state.261 On the other hand, if the impact on interstate commerce re-
sults from the nondiscriminatory pursuit of a valid state interest, a
more tolerant approach applies. In those instances, the Court bal-
ances the burden placed on interstate commerce against the weight
and character of the state interest involved.262 It is by this standard,
rather than by the stringent scrutiny of a favored economic doctrine,
that efforts to hold directors of foreign corporations accountable for
their negligence must be judged.
The fiduciary statute proposed here is not tainted by the favoritism
toward in-state interests that triggers the more stringent commerce
clause test. On the contrary, the statute would simply apply to direc-
tors of a foreign corporation that has shareholders in the enacting
overs-Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause, 14 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 499, 525 (1989).
255. See Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-
of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARv. L. RE,. 806, 814 (1971); see also Kozyris, supra note
254, at 516-17 (finding in Supreme Court decisions invalidating state restrictions
on instruments of transportation support for commerce clause challenges to dif-
fering state regulations in the corporate area).
256. See Horowitz, supra note 255, at 814.
257. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AEmmiCAN CONsTrrTUToNAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1988)(func-
tion of commerce clause is to "ensure solidarity, not economic efficiency").
258. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
259. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2013 (1992)(No.
91-471); see generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protection-
ism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091
(1986).
260. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992)(No. 91-636); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y.
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447, U.S.
27, 36 (1980); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
261. Healy v. The Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
262. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 771
(1945).
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state the same requirement of due care demanded of directors of do-
mestic corporations. Nor does closer inspection betray a practical dis-
crimination lurking beneath a superficially benign regulation; the
evenhanded application of a high standard of due care does not cloak
an invidious attempt to put out-of-state competitors at an unfair disad-
vantage.263 Indeed, it is states' adoption of more permissive fiduciary
standards that has been disparaged as an unsavory attempt to lure cor-
porations by offering an improper inducement to management.264
It might still be argued that the proposed statute imposes an exces-
sive burden on interstate commerce, or that its extraterritorial reach
extends beyond the limits placed on state sovereignty by the com-
merce clause. In particular, three distinct lines of commerce clause
decisions, discussed below, could be invoked to challenge the validity
of such legislation. Although each admittedly has some surface appli-
cability to a fiduciary outreach statute, the proposed statute has cru-
cial differences from the laws that the Court has found unacceptable.
At most, the proposed statute would have to be carefully tailored to
avoid the objections that proved fatal in these earlier cases.
A. MITE and CTS: Deference to the Lex Incorporationis in Anti-
takeover Legislation Cases
The most conspicuous authority upon which to mount a commerce
clause challenge to the proposed statute is a pair of Supreme Court
decisions on the validity of state takeover acts: Edgar v. MITE Corp.2 6 5
and its sequel, CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation.266 MITE
263. This was the ground on which the Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad-
vertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), struck down a North Carolina statute re-
quiring that closed apple containers sold in the state either be marked with a
United States Department of Agriculture grade or marked "unclassified," "not
graded," or "grade not determined." Id. at 339. The Court found that the prohibi-
tion on marking containers with state grades amounted to impermissible discrim-
ination against Washington apple growers, who incurred increased costs by
having to prepare special crates for shipment into North Carolina, and who were
barred from capitalizing on the superior reputation of the Washington apple in-
dustry. Id at 350-53. By contrast, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S.
117 (1978), sustained a Maryland law forbidding producers or refiners of petro-
leum products from owning or operating retail gasoline service stations in the
state. Even though almost all of the excluded producers and refiners were out-of-
state businesses, and almost all of the nonintegrated dealers who benefitted from
the elimination of powerful competition were Maryland businesses, id at 137-38,
the Court refused to characterize the restriction as discriminatory. Instead, the
Court emphasized that the statute did not favor in-state businesses as such over
out-of-state businesses; in particular, the Court noted that a number of interstate
companies that did not refine or produce gasoline already operated gas stations in
Maryland. Id. at 125-26.
264. See supra note 12.
265. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
266. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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and CTS set limits on states' ability to place conditions on tender offers
that could inhibit their consummation. The proposed statute threat-
ens the same type of inhibition. In some instances a heightened stan-
dard of care might inflict liability on directors of a target corporation
who acquiesced in a tender offer or other change of control that ulti-
mately proved unprofitable to the corporation's shareholders. Argua-
bly, the spectre of personal damages might so discourage board
cooperation in even potentially beneficial changes of control that it
would impose an impermissible burden under MITE and CTS.
Both decisions refer to the broad power that a state enjoys in regu-
lating corporations created under the laws of that state. An extreme
reading might construe these references as engraving the "internal af-
fairs" doctrine267 into constitutional law, thus categorically barring
legislation such as that advanced by this article as intrusive. Even if
the two opinions do not create an absolute bar to foreign regulation of
domestic corporations, they might be read as sufficiently wary of such
regulation to presumptively prohibit a fiduciary outreach statute.
Although these concerns have some foundation, a closer inspection of
the opinions in MITE, and more recently in CTS, discloses that they do
not provide grounds for finding the proposed statute violative of the
commerce clause.
MITE was decided against the background of a rising tide of state
anti-takeover legislation that placed formidable obstacles in the way
of tender offers.268 The Illinois act at issue imposed delay, cost, and
uncertainty typical of the antitakeover statutes of that vintage. That
act required any takeover offer for the shares of a target company269
to be registered with the Illinois secretary of state. An offer could not
become effective until twenty days after the bidder had filed a regis-
tration statement. Meanwhile, the Illinois secretary of state could sus-
pend the offer indefinitely by commencing a hearing to review the
offer for substantive unfairness. Even if the secretary declined to ini-
tiate a hearing on his own, he was required to hold one if requested by
either a majority of the target company's outside directors or by Illi-
nois stockholders owning ten percent of the target shares. The act
stated the grounds upon which the secretary could deny registration in
267. See infra part V-B.
268. See Sharis Jinks, Comment, State Regulation of Tender Offers: How Much is
Constitutional?, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 678 (1981); Diane S. Wilner & Craig A.
Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1976).
269. Target companies were defined expansively to include companies in which Illi-
nois residents owned at least ten percent of the company's shares. In the alterna-
tive, a corporation could qualify as a target company by meeting two of the three
following conditions: location of its principal office in Illinois, incorporation in
Illinois, or the presence of at least ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in
surplus within the state. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 627 (1982).
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sweeping terms. The grounds included not only failure to provide full
and fair disclosure, but also a "tend[ency]" to defraud or deceive offer-
ees or a determination that the offer was simply "inequitable." 270
Only the conclusion that the act imposed an excessive burden on
interstate commerce commanded a majority of the Court.271 The
Court's opinion noted the interference with the free and efficient op-
eration of the marketplace that would result from a veto of a nation-
wide tender offer by the Illinois secretary of state.272 On the other
side of the equation, the state's asserted interest in protecting Illinois
investors could not justify the burdens placed on out-of-state transac-
tions.273 The Court expressly rejected Illinois's assertion that the act
conferred substantial benefits on shareholders. 274 In addition, a plu-
rality supported Justice White's reasoning that the commerce clause
condemned the extraterritorial scope of Illinois regulation. The act
purported to reach securities transactions that took place entirely
outside of the state. This ambitious projection of Illinois authority, the
plurality concluded, violated the limitations placed on state sover-
eignty by the commerce clause.275
CTS sustained the validity of a post-MITE Indiana anti-takeover
statute that differed in significant detail from the earlier Illinois act.
Most notably,27 6 Indiana's regulatory scheme applied only to corpora-
tions chartered in the state. When a certain number or proportion of a
domestic corporation's shares or shareholders were located in Indiana,
the act's restrictive provisions came into play if the corporation chose
to adopt them.277 Under these provisions, the acquiror of a substantial
portion of the shares of an Indiana corporation covered by the act
would not automatically be entitled to vote its "control shares."
Rather, voting rights-and hence acquisition of control-hinged on ap-
proval by a majority of those shareholders who were not affiliated
with the acquiror or with any officer or director of the corporation.278
The ability of a state to offer redress to resident shareholders who
have been injured by directors' negligence is consistent with the rea-
270. Id at 626-27.
271. A plurality endorsed Justice White's contention that the Illinois Act was pre-
empted by the Williams Act. Id. at 630-40 (White, J., plurality).
272. 1&d at 643-44.
273. Id. at 644.
274. Id. at 644-45.
275. 1& at 641-43.
276. The discussion here addresses only the constitutional analysis in MITE. The
Court also held that Indiana's statute was consistent with the Williams Act; un-
like the Illinois act, the Indiana statute did not tilt toward management and did
not authorize indefinite delays in the consummation of tender offers. CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 78-88 (1987).
277. Id. at 72-73.
278. I& at 73-74.
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soning of CTS279 in at least two key respects. First, the proposed stat-
ute draws no distinction between the directors of domestic and foreign
corporations; hence, the statute is nondiscriminatory. The Court in
CTS did not read the limitation of Indiana's takeover act as discrimina-
tory, and the absence of formal discrimination was crucial to the CTS
decision. The Court noted at the outset of its commerce clause analy-
sis that "[t]he principal objects of dormant commerce clause scrutiny
are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce."28 0 Re-
flecting at least partial endorsement of a position that has drawn in-
creasing support,2 8 ' the Court suggested that state regulation that
does not reflect overt favoritism is entitled to a powerful presumption
of validity. Even if a state's restriction in practice falls principally
upon out-of-state actors-as the Indiana statute did-the Court de-
clared that a disparate impact alone does not trigger the skeptical
scrutiny provoked by outright discrimination.28 2
The proposed statute and the Indiana act share a second similarity:
neither authorizes the state to erect an insuperable obstacle to shifts
in corporate control. As the Court emphasized, Indiana had not for-
bidden anyone from attempting to gain control of Indiana corporations
through the purchase of shares; rather, the state had merely
"provid[ed] regulatory procedures designed for the better protection
of the corporations' shareholders." 283 This feature presented an obvi-
ous contrast to the Illinois statute struck down in MITE, whose em-
powerment of the Illinois secretary of state to "block a nationwide
279. As the more recent of the Court's two decisions concerning state takeover legisla-
tion, as well as one whose entire commerce clause analysis commanded a majority
of the Court, CTS must be regarded as the Court's authoritative pronouncement
on this topic. CTS did not purport to overrule or even to qualify the commerce
clause analysis found in either the majority or the plurality opinion in MITE.
Nevertheless, CTS appears to signal a more tolerant, less hostile attitude toward
takeover legislation than that found in Justice White's opinion in MITE. See C.
William Baxley, The Constitutionality of the Delaware Anti-Takeover Statute, 13
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 319,325-26 (1990); Alan E. Garfield, State Competence to
Regulate Corporate Takeovers: Lessons from State Takeover Statutes, 17 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 535, 536-37 (1989); William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship be-
tween Federal and State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 241, 337-38 (1990). That Justice White dissented in CTS, CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 97-101 (1987), may have reflected a shift
in sentiment on the Court.
280. Id. at 87.
281. See id. at 95-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 505 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 955
(1989); Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 874 F.2d 926, 941-45 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989); Regan, supra note 259, at 1091; Robert A. Sedler, The
Negative Commerce Clause As a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation:
An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985).
282. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
283. IL at 93.
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tender offer" was found objectionable.284 Likewise, the ability of
shareholders in a given state to hold directors accountable for the inju-
ries produced by their negligence in connection with a takeover bid
would not pose an absolute bar to shifts in control. On the contrary,
directors' liability could be assessed only after the shift in control had
been accomplished.
Insofar as the proposed statute would provide management of tar-
get companies with an incentive to accept rather than resist attractive
tender offers, the statute would actually promote the flow of inter-
state commerce. Conversely, where tender offers did not materialize,
the absence of raiders could be attributed to the satisfactory record of
management rather than to the type of artificial roadblocks struck
down in MITE. Thus, the tender offer-or at least the credible possi-
bility of one-would serve its function of spurring management "to
perform well so that stock prices remain high."285
On the other hand, liability in some instances might be predicated
on management's acceptance of a tender offer or other overture whose
terms are deemed inadequate. 28 6 The spectre of damages could cast a
chilling effect on the willingness of directors to approve a takeover
that they genuinely believed to be beneficial to the company and its
shareholders. Such an inhibition would arguably violate the Court's
proscription of a single state's control of a nationwide tender offer.
The limited reach of the proposed statute, however, should shield it
from this objection. The statute only allows damages strictly commen-
surate with the harm inflicted on residents of the forum state. A con-
scientious effort to tailor damages to a state's interest in protecting its
residents should not be regarded as tantamount to interference with a
multistate transaction.
Moreover, any overreaching can be addressed by fine-tuning direc-
tor liability rather than categorically invalidating it. For example, a
state might go so far as to make any rejection of a plausible tender
offer per se grounds for liability. In that case, the statute would vio-
late the commerce clause unless the state amended it to conform to
traditional concepts of negligence: i.e., an actual showing that the di-
rectors had failed to exercise due care in deciding to refuse the tender
offer. In addition, the commerce clause might prohibit a state from
lightly presuming the existence of damages; a substantial prima facie
showing of the inadequacy of the takeover's terms might be required
in order to go forward. Such a requirement would help deflect asser-
tions that the mere threat of protracted litigation would deter direc-
tors from fairly considering changes in corporate control. For similar
284. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
285. Id.
286. The holding in Van Gorkom illustrates this category. See supra notes 4-7 and
accompanying text.
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reasons, commerce clause values may require sufficiently streamlined
procedures for resolving negligence claims, thereby avoiding any un-
due burden that might deter directors from pursuing attractive
deals.28 7
The congruence between the limited reach of the proposed statute
and the state interest which it serves also helps to explain how the
proposed statute can be reconciled with CTS's treatment of the inter-
nal affairs of a corporation. The proposed statute, although having a
potential to impact an out-of-state corporation's internal affairs, is not
primarily designed with that end in mind. The CTS approach to the
internal affairs doctrine has its roots in MITE. The MITE Court re-
jected Illinois's contention that its interest in regulating the internal
affairs of domestic corporations justified its takeover statute. That ra-
tionale failed because the statute's restrictions applied to tender offers
for foreign as well as domestic corporations. As the Court stated, Illi-
nois had "no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign cor-
porations." 28 8 By contrast, the Indiana statute upheld in CTS confined
its reach to domestic corporations. Thus, the act served Indiana's
"substantial interest in preventing the corporate form from becoming
a shield for unfair corporate dealing."28 9 That interest in turn derived
from the manner in which business has traditionally been structured:
states have assumed the responsibility to "create corporations, to pre-
scribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by
purchasing their shares."290 The Court observed that the free market
system prevailing in the American economy "depends at its core upon
the fact that a corporation-except in the rarest situations-is organ-
ized under, and governed.., by... the corporate law of the State of its
incorporation." 291
Considered in isolation, thesi statements lend support to the prop-
osition that an ambitious outreach statute would presumptively vio-
late the commerce clause. In the context of the Court's broader
discussion of Indiana's legitimate interests, however, these comments
do not reflect an intent to confer constitutional status on a strict inter-
nal affairs doctrine.292 Rather, they demonstrate that all the com-
287. The mere possibility that a statute may limit the number of successful offers does
not itself violate the commerce clause where the statute does not bar efforts to
gain control. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 93-94
(1987).
288. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1987).
289. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987).
290. Id. at 91.
291. Id. at 90.
292. See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 29 (1987), for discussion of
the view that CTS "comes dangerously close to," id. at 34, but ultimately avoids,
constitutionalizing the internal affairs doctrine; accord Norwood P. Beveridge,
Jr., The Internal Affairs Doctrine: The Proper Law of a Corporation, 44 Bus.
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merce clause requires is a sufficient degree of interest in the
transactions which the state seeks to regulate. Because of the historic
primacy that states have assumed in regulating corporations created
under their laws, Indiana's "purpose... to protect the shareholders of
Indiana corporations" 2 93 outweighed any encroachment on interstate
commerce. This objective drew particular strength from the fact that
the act's provisions applied only to corporations having a substantial
number of shareholders in Indiana; therefore, the statute's operation
would always "affect a substantial number of Indiana residents, whom
Indiana indisputably has an interest in protecting." 294 Thus, it is the
protection of individuals and entities in whom the state has a direct
LAW. 693 (1989). Even Professor Kozyris, who appears to sympathize with a read-
ing of the commerce clause that would lead to constitutional enforcement of the
lex incorporationis, see Kozyris, supra note 254, at 509-10, acknowledges that ap-
parently "neither CTS nor MITE directly constitutionalizes the lex incorpora-
tionis." Id. at 508. It is true that the Delaware Supreme Court has seized on
passages from CTS and MITE to pronounce the internal affairs doctrine as resting
on constitutional foundations. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216-17
(Del. 1987). However, that conclusion smacks more of a predictably tendentious
reading of the two cases, from a state with the greatest stake in the "Delawariza-
tion" of corporation law, than of a fair construction of the Court's opinions.
293. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
294. Id. at 93. The weightiness of the state's interest in the welfare of its residents is
underscored by its approval of statutory preferences in favor of residents. Such
preferences have been upheld against challenges under the commerce clause, see
White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983)(upholding
city's requirement that city residents comprise at least 50% of work force of all
construction projects funded by city); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458
U.S. 941, 956 (1982)(state's ownership of ground water "may support a limited
preference for its own citizens in the utilization" of water); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980)(sustaining state policy of confining sale of cement by state-
owned plant to state residents); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,
810 (1976)("[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a
State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others"); but see Lewis v. BT
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980)(invalidating statute prohibiting out-of-
state banks from owning Florida investment advisory businesses); the equal pro-
tection clause, see Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983)(upholding state resi-
dency requirement for admission to tuition-free public schools); and the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, see Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978)(upholding large discrepancy between license fees
charged to residents and nonresidents for recreational hunting); but see Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985)(striking down rule limiting
bar admissions to state residents); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978)(invali-
dating hiring preference for state's residents in all employment related to the
development of state's oil and gas resources, where state could not demonstrate
that influx of nonresidents seeking employment was principal source of state's
unemployment problem or that blanket preference was necessary to effectuate
state's interest); see generally Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1988).
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interest, not an abstract apotheosis of the lex incorporationis, that lies
at the heart of CTS's approval of the Indiana statute.
Viewed in the light of this emphasis on the state's ultimate inter-
est, the proposed fiduciary statute fits within the latitude allowed by
CTS and in MITE. MITE acknowledged that "protecting local inves-
tors is plainly a legitimate state objective;" the Illinois statute, to the
extent that it interfered with out-of-state transactions by nonresident
shareholders, simply failed to advance that objective.295 By contrast,
the statute proposed here is tailored to promote only the state's inter-
est in protecting resident shareholders. The scope of the statute dif-
fers from those involved in both MITE and CTS. While Illinois
improperly attempted to protect nonresident shareholders of nonresi-
dent corporations, the Court permitted Indiana to protect nonresident
shareholders of resident corporations. By providing redress for resi-
dent shareholders of nonresident corporations, the proposed statute
rests on the same fundamental foundation as CTS: broad state power
to protect those who are governed by that state's regime of rights and
responsibilities. That one type of protection arises out of incorpora-
tion and the other out of residency should not create a constitutional
distinction. Indeed, it would be ironic if technical incorporation in a
state-often little more than a formality-were to carry more weight
than residency.2 96
B. Brown-Forman and the Limits of Extraterritorial Impact
Another possible line of attack on the proposed fiduciary statute is
suggested by Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority,297 which struck down a New York liquor statute because of
its excessive extraterritorial impact. Brown-Forman, along with ante-
cedent holdings, suggest commerce clause limitations on the extent to
which a state statute may influence decisionmaking by directors of
foreign corporations. The out-of-state reverberations of the statute
proposed here, however, differ in crucial respects from the features
that proved fatal in Brown-Forman.
Brown-Forman struck down New York's liquor law because of its
relatively direct control over liquor prices in other states.298 The law
mandated that the wholesale price of liquor sold in New York must
295. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
296. See supra note 294; see also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325-30 (1983)(resi-
dence requirements generally valid); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex reL
State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 653 (1950)(Douglas, J., concurring)(indicating
endorsement of the presumptive validity of blue sky laws); Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917)(same).
297. 476 U.S. 573 (1986), cited in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69,
88 (1987).
298. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,583
(1986).
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not exceed the lowest price that the distiller was simultaneously
charging elsewhere in the country. By preventing distillers from low-
ering their prices in other states, 299 the statute violated the proscrip-
tion laid down in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.300 that a state may not
"project its legislation into [another state] by regulating the price to be
paid in that state for [goods] acquired there."3 01
Later, in Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.,302 the Court relied largely on
Brown-Forman to strike down a Connecticut statute compelling out-
of-state shippers of beer to affirm that the prices charged Connecticut
wholesalers were no higher than the prices at which the same prod-
ucts were then being sold in certain neighboring states. The Court
focused on the variety of restraints that the dormant commerce clause
imposes on the permissible extraterritorial effects of state economic
regulations.3 03 Like New York's liquor law, the Connecticut statute
improperly interfered with brewers' pricing decisions in other
states.304
In most instances in which the projection of commercial regulation
has transgressed the limits of state power, indications of economic pro-
tectionism have tainted the defective statute. The presence of state
protectionism, the principal evil at which the commerce clause was
directed,305 heightens the Court's scrutiny of regulatory effects be-
yond a state's boundary. For example, Baldwin rejected New York's
rationale that the state's farmers must be shielded from lower prices
299. For the month during which a distiller's posted price was in effect in New York, it
could not lower its price for the same item in other states without the approval of
the New York State Liquor Authority. Id.
300. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
301. Id. at 521, quoted in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 (1986). In Baldwin, the Court struck down a New York
statute barring the retail sale in New York of milk purchased outside the state at
a lower wholesale price than the minimum price that New York then imposed for
wholesale transactions within the state. The Court in Brown-Forman also re-
ferred to its decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), which
struck down an Arizona statute limiting trains to seventy freight cars. Because
other states did not impose this restriction on train lengths, carriers whose trains
passed through Arizona were confronted with a choice between two alternatives:
to uncouple longer trains to conform to Arizona's restriction while in the state, or
simply to place on such routes only trains of seventy or fewer cars. Since it was
frequently not feasible to reconstitute trains near the Arizona border, carriers
were forced to comply with Arizona's deviant limitation while traveling in other
states as well. Id. at 774-75. In light of the negligible contribution that the Ari-
zona law made to enhancing safety, id. at 775-78, the Court held invalid Arizona's
effective "control" of rail traffic outside the state. Id. at 774-75.
302. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
303. See id. at 336-37.
304. See id. at 338-39.
305. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 276 (1984); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979); Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
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in other states in order to ensure an adequate supply of milk to New
York residents. Instead, the Court recast New York's defense as a
pretext for the kind of barrier against economic competition that the
commerce clause was intended to forbid.306 Similarly, Brown-For, man
noted that the prohibition on protectionism encompasses efforts to se-
cure for in-state consumers an advantage over consumers else-
where,3 07 as New York's liquor law did by depriving liquor customers
in other states of the lower prices that they would have otherwise en-
joyed. In Healy the aura of protectionism was even more
pronounced.308
Unlike the regulatory schemes struck down in Baldwin, Brown-
Forman, and Healy, the fiduciary statute proposed here would not fur-
ther protectionist ends. A state's attempt to hold directors liable for
the harm that they have inflicted on resident shareholders is qualita-
tively different from an effort to benefit local consumers at the ex-
pense of consumers in other states. Nor should a program designed to
ensure accountability for negligent conduct be equated with state reg-
ulation that coerces companies to divert business from other states, as
the discriminatory statute in Healy (by its assault on the advantage of
selling beer in neighboring states) had the capacity to do.
The only respect in which the proposed statute might prod a shift
in business operations lies in its possible influence on a company's
choice of state of incorporation. By rendering states with lenient fidu-
ciary standards less effective havens for careless conduct, the statute
might reduce the attraction of incorporation in states such as Dela-
ware. However, even if the potential for such an impact were signifi-
cant,3 09 this effect on business decisionmaking does not resemble the
interference with economic activity found illegitimate in Baldwin,
Brown-Forman, and Healy. Those statutes altered or superseded the
306. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 571, 523, 527 (1935).
307. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580
(1986).
308. The Connecticut statute exempted from its affirmation requirement brewers or
shippers who sold beer only within the state. By freeing from price regulations
brewers and shippers who confined their sales to Connecticut, the statute enacted
a "patent discrimination" which discouraged those seeking to profit from the
Connecticut market from pursuing opportunities in neighboring states. Healy v.
Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 341 (1989).
309. Reasons in addition to the broad discretion afforded management are often of-
fered for the appeal of Delaware as a state in which to incorporate. These include
comprehensive corporate statutes, see Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for
Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 885, 918 (1990), a
judiciary well-versed in matters of corporate law, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, Toward on Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEx. L. REv. 469, 522 (1987), and a substantial and stable body of case law, see
Daniel R. Fische4 The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited;- Reflections on Recent De-
velopnents in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 942 (1982).
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ordinary operation of economic competition in other states, involving
such decisions as what price to charge for milk or whether to sell beer
in a given market. Distorting out-of-state market forces to deprive
consumers or businesses of advantages strikes at the heart of the com-
merce clause's prohibition of state interference with interstate com-
merce. By contrast, the commerce clause does not value the artificial
advantage that a state creates for itself by erecting a permissive regu-
latory regime. Delaware's eagerness to entice companies to incorpo-
rate in that state does not deserve the same constitutional solicitude as
the ability of Vermont farmers to produce milk more cheaply than
their New York counterparts.31 0
The statute does not exercise the type of "control" over out-of-state
events found impermissible in the cases described above. As already
noted, the statute would neither compel nor forbid directors to act in a
certain way with respect to major decisions. In this sense the statute
differs substantially from state regulation that explicitly or effectively
dictates the price which must be charged for goods in other states.
Admittedly, the prospect of liability to even a fraction of a corpora-
tion's shareholders might dissuade directors from pursuing a course
that they might otherwise take. However, the potential deterrent ef-
fect of post hoc liability does not inevitably invalidate extraterritorial
regulation. Under products liability principles, for example, a decision
made and carried out in one state furnishes grounds for liability in
310. A challenge to a fiduciary outreach statute might still invoke Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), to argue that the same level of scrutiny of
extraterritorial effects exists even in the absence of protectionist elements.
There, Arizona evenhandedly banned long trains from both intrastate and inter-
state routes. However, heightened scrutiny was not required to reach the Court's
result in Southern Paciftc. The undoubted burden on the flow of interstate rail
traffic clearly outweighed the "at most slight and dubious advantage," i& at 779,
created by Arizona's restriction. By contrast, a statute that appears to represent a
plausible effort to promote a legitimate state interest-such as standards of care
to protect resident investors-would receive more sympathetic judicial examina-
tion. See e.g., Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S.
493, 525-26 (1989); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Arkansas Elec. Coop.
Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Service Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 394 (1983); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981). Even in the specific area of
safety regulations imposed on channels of transportation, the Court since South-
ern Pacific has expressed a more tolerant attitude toward regulation that fails to
harmonize with those of most other states. The Court has indicated that unusual
requirements will fall only when they manifestly place an excessive burden on
interstate commerce. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 530
(1959)("state legislatures plainly have great leeway in providing safety regula-
tions for all vehicles"); see also Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662,
670 (1981)(Powell, J., plurality)(" '[If] safety justifications are not illusory, the
court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in com-
parison with related burdens on interstate commerce.' ")(quoting Raymond Mo-
tor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449 (1978)(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
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another.3 11 In both instances harm felt in the state imposing liability
can be attributed to delinquent conduct outside of that state. Like-
wise, the links to commerce within the state in both cases-the subse-
quent purchase of the defective product and the earlier purchase of
shares respectively 3 2 -- arise from transactions removed in time from
the original out-of-state conduct. Both forms of liability seek to pro-
vide incentive for the exercise of due care by those whose actions di-
rectly affect residents of the state. While the proposed fiduciary
statute would impose personal rather than corporate liability, this dif-
ference has no constitutional significance.3 13
Nor does the proposed fiduciary statute present the same danger of
"inconsistent obligations"314 that the Court found ominous in Brown-
Forman and Healy.315 If numerous states were to adopt affirmation
laws, their conflicting requirements would produce "just the kind of
competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the Com-
merce Clause was meant to preclude."31 6 By contrast, susceptibility to
a variety of negligence standards ranging from lax to responsible
would not create this type of economic gridlock. Rather, the proposed
statute would simply enable a state to exact proportionate redress for
failure to observe due care toward its resident shareholders.
Given this element of proportionality, the statute would comport
with the commerce clause philosophy reflected in the "internal consis-
tency" criterion for state taxation of multistate businesses. Under this
principle, any formula of taxation "must be such that, if applied by
every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary
311. See Bowman v. Niagra Machine and Tool Works, Inc., 832 F.2d 1052, 1055-56 (7th
Cir. 1987)(rejecting contention that any state regulation of product liability vio-
lates dormant commerce clause) see also Note, Products Liability and the zoice
of Law, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1452 (1965); cf. Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State
Competition in the Product Liability System, 80 GEO. L.J. 617 (contending that
pro-plaintiff conflicts rule in products liability cases discourages states from en-
acting pro-plaintiff substantive laws).
312. Nor should it matter that directors' liability would flow from the earlier sale of
shares by a third party, either the corporation or a private seller. In products
liability as well, a manufacturer can be held liable notwithstanding the existence
of one or more intermediaries who are more directly responsible for the sale of
the defective product to the injured plaintiff. See Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584
F.2d 833, 835 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); Pan-Alaska Fisheries,
Inc. v. Marine Const. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1977); MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTs § 402A (1977).
313. Cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)(upholding forum's personal jurisdiction
over individual employees of corporation).
314. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583
(1986).
315. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989)(commerce clause prohibits
"inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory re-
gime into the jurisdiction of another State").
316. Id. at 337.
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business's income being taxed."3 17 Similarly, the proliferation of fidu-
ciary outreach statutes, each compensating only injury to resident
shareholders, would not produce total liability above the damages that
could be ascribed to directors' negligence.
Aside from specific requirements of proportionality,3 18 the exist-
ence of varying obligations in different jurisdictions does not necessar-
ily offend constitutional principles. Indeed, the Court tolerates
disparate standards among the states even in the regulation of so fun-
damental a right as free speech. For example, a state may make it
easy, difficult, or impossible for private plaintiffs in defamation suits
to recover damages, as long as minimal constitutional requirements
are met.319 Likewise, a state may elect whether to designate sexually
oriented material as punishable obscenity, subject to the broad criteria
laid down by the Court.320 In neither case does the prospect that a
lawsuit in the most stringent jurisdiction might dampen or disrupt na-
tionwide circulation constitute a sufficient objection. The latitude
granted to states in these areas suggests considerable latitude as well
in applying their own fiduciary standards to compensate resident
shareholders for injuries caused by directors' negligence. It would be
incongruous for the Constitution to allow the most prudish jurisdic-
tion to determine the contents or dissemination of a national periodi-
cal, while forbidding a state with high fiduciary standards from
making directors take into account the importance that jurisdiction
attaches to due care.
C. Bendix and the Convergence of the Commerce Clause and Due
Process
A final commerce clause challenge to the proposed fiduciary stat-
ute might be mounted under the Court's decision in Bendix Autolite
Corporation v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc..321 Bendix struck down an
317. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983); see
also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2255
(1992), Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984)(requirement that tax, if
applied to every jurisdiction, would create "no impermissible interference with
free trade"); see generally Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency"Foolish?:
Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 138 (1988).
318. In addition to requiring internal consistency, Container also referred to "external
consistency": "the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must ac-
tually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated." Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). In other words, the
state may not tax income derived from business transacted beyond its border.
Again, by confining liability to injury suffered by residents of the enacting state,
the proposed fiduciary statute meets the spirit of this requirement.
319. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
320. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
321. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
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Ohio statute tolling the statute of limitations for foreign corporations
that did not consent to the jurisdiction of Ohio courts. On its face, the
holding suggests the Court's wariness of laws that demand accounta-
bility by corporations lacking ongoing involvement with the enacting
state. Closer review, however, reveals significant distinctions between
the excessive scope of Ohio's law and the fiduciary statute proposed
here.
The lawsuit that had been authorized in Bendix by Ohio's suspen-
sion of its statute of limitations clearly fell beyond the ambit of state
power. Bendix, a Delaware corporation, brought a breach of contract
action in Ohio against Midwesco, an Illinois corporation. The claim
arose out of Midwesco's installation of a boiler system at a Bendix fa-
cility in Ohio six years prior to the suit. When Midwesco sought to
invoke Ohio's four-year statute of limitations, Bendix cited Ohio's sus-
pension of the statute for any period that someone is not "present" in
the state. Midwesco was not present because it was not domiciled in
Ohio and had not appointed an agent for service of process; Ohio
deems designation of an agent to effect consent to the general jurisdic-
tion of the Ohio courts.322
The Court shielded Midwesco from liability because of the inordi-
nate burden that Ohio's law imposed on interstate commerce.323 Spe-
cifically, the Court objected to the disproportionate price that Ohio
extracted from foreign corporations for the privilege of doing business
in the state: indefinite exposure to suit in Ohio unless a corporation
submitted to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts.324 Overtones of
due process entered into the Court's analysis; the Court noted that
Ohio's law compelled foreign corporations to defend themselves "with
reference to all transactions," even those in which the corporation
lacked minimum contacts sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction.25
In drawing on both commerce clause and due process concerns,
Bendix presumptively disapproved of state efforts to assess liability
against foreign corporations that have not established a significant
presence in the state. However, Ohio's basis for subjecting Midwesco
to liability was unusually tenuous, and the holding in Bendix does not
preclude the operation of outreach statutes like that proposed here.
The defective Ohio statute pressed too far by bringing within its com-
pass corporations that otherwise lay beyond the jurisdictional reach of
the state. By contrast, the proposed fiduciary statute would apply only
in those circumstances where conditions sufficed to establish personal
322. Id. at 889-90.
323. Id. at 891.
324. Id. at 893.
325. Id. (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction.3 26
In addition, while the Bendix Court declined to determine whether
Ohio's law amounted to discrimination against out-of-state entities, 327
the opinion bears several earmarks of the Court's vigilance against dis-
parate treatment of such entities. The Court left little doubt that Ohio
had the burden of justifying its subjection of foreign corporations to
"requirements more onerous than those imposed on domestic par-
ties."3 28 Ultimately, the Court refused to tolerate Ohio's manner of
imposing "a greater burden on out-of-state companies than it does on
Ohio companies."3 29 Indeed, Justice Scalia, concurring in the judg-
ment, asserted that Ohio's discriminatory treatment of interstate com-
merce constituted the sole defect of the statute.33 0 By contrast, the
proposed fiduciary statute would avoid this defect by scrupulously ex-
tending to directors of domestic and foreign corporations alike the
identical requirement of due care.33 1
V. CHOICE OF LAW: THE SURMOUNTABLE BARRIER OF
PREFERENCE FOR THE LEX INCORPORATIONIS
The ability to meet constitutional concerns does not resolve reser-
vations about the compatibility of the proposed fiduciary statute with
326. See supra part II. Even in those situations in which the theory of jurisdiction
advanced by this article might appear doubtful, the foundation for liability under
the proposed fiduciary statute falls outside of the Court's fundamental objection
to the invalid law in Bendix. Whereas foreign corporations in Bendix were forced
to concede to Ohio courts jurisdiction over transactions "in which Ohio had no
interest," Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 895
(1988) (emphasis added), jurisdiction under the statute proposed here is premised
on the existence of an important state interest. Likewise, while any interests that
prompted passage of the Ohio law were "not much advanced by the statute," id.
at 891, the proposed fiduciary statute would directly promote the state's interest
in protecting resident shareholders from directors' negligence. Thus, the effort to
tailor the scope of potential liability to the precise state interest at stake distin-
guishes the proposed fiduciary statute from the crude overbreadth of the statute
in Bendix.
327. The Court elected instead to consider only whether the law imposed an imper-
missible burden. Id.
328. Id. at 893.
329. Id. at 894.
330. Id. at 898.
331. The significance of this distinction from the statute in Bendix is heightened by
the unusual severity of Ohio's discrepancy in the status accorded domestic and
foreign corporations. By making Ohio's statute of limitations available only on
the state's own onerous terms, the statute effectively deprived foreign corpora-
tions alone of a defense that is an "integral part of the legal system .. " Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988). The Bendix
Court displayed obvious skepticism toward denial of "ordinary legal defenses or
like privileges" id., to out-of-state businesses. Such skepticism is not warranted
toward statutes, like that proposed here, that do not skew the state's regime of
liability by selectively magnifying the exposure of out-of-state entities.
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established principles of choice of law.33 2 In a sense reconciliation is at
once easy and impossible, for the area of conflicts of laws is conspicu-
ous for its absence of universally recognized governing principles. To
one not immersed in the area, the quarrels among choice-of-law theo-
rists often resemble in intensity and obscurity the ancient disputes
among competing schools of Greek philosophy. The result appears to
be, if not entirely the "judicial nightmare"3 3 3 or "reign of chaos"3 3 4
condemned by courts, a field in which competing approaches have
stymied the emergence of a coherent set of generally accepted tenets.
This is not to say that a choice-of-law assessment of the proposed
fiduciary statute must take place against the backdrop of doctrinal an-
archy. As discussed below, two principal camps may be discerned in
the debate which has raged over organizing principles: a traditional
school that favors fixed rules, and a fluid approach that relies on a
multi-factored analysis. The latter, of course, could be expected to of-
fer a more sympathetic framework for the departure from the lex in-
corporationis proposed here. Even more traditional adherents to the
firm rule of lex incorporationis, however, have conceded that the rule
admits of some exceptions.
A. The Confficts Revolution and Counterrevolution: A Brief Overview
To a striking degree, debate over the appropriate manner of select-
ing applicable law has centered in academe rather than in the courts.
The voluminous commentary on choice of law defies facile sum-
mary.3 3 5 However, a brief review of the salient tension in conflicts
analysis may provide a useful context for an examination of the pro-
posed outreach statute.
The hallmark of choice-of-law doctrine before the upheaval in con-
flicts theory was the quest for comprehensive rules that would dictate
the law to be applied irrespective of the interests and policies of the
forum state. Thus, for example, tort liability was presumed to be de-
termined by reference to lex loci delicti.336 Such rules assumed that in
a given field, the law that must govern any dispute could be discerned
by identifying the jurisdiction that had a certain designated connec-
332. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,324 (1981)(Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)(Minnesota courts' choice of law "plainly unsound as a matter of nor-
mal conflicts law" but constitutionally permissible).
333. Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975); accord In re Air
Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C. on January 13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333, 336
(D.D.C. 1983).
334. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
335. For an ambitious attempt at a comprehensive view of choice of law, see Joseph
William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). Professor Singer enu-
merates factors that a "consensus" agrees are relevant to choice-of-law determi-
nations. Id. at 33-34.
336. REsTATEmENT OF CONFruo OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
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tion with that dispute.33 7 Ideologically, this approach sprang from the-
ories of territoriality and vested rights.33 As a matter of policy, the
traditional system rested on the promise of predictability and uni-
formity.3 3 9 For its authority and primer, traditional methodology
looked to the First Restatement of Conflicts of Laws.3 40
The assault on traditional conflicts theory criticized both its stated
methodology and its assertedly false pretensions. The old order was
condemned for inflexibly exalting certainty and simplicity over the
advancement of state interests and substantive justice in the particu-
lar case. In addition, the traditional system in practice had failed even
to achieve that vaunted predictability which was purportedly its over-
riding virtue. As long ago as 1933, Professor Cavers could report a
"'confusion of authority' "341 in the area of conflicts. He observed that
some courts were already deviating from the dictates of conventional
doctrine when the equities of a particular case demanded, though still
under the guise of simply choosing the appropriate jurisdiction whose
law should apply.3 42 Cavers advocated a result-oriented resolution of
conflicts cases, under which courts would take into account "justice
between litigating individuals" and "broader considerations of social
policy"343 to achieve a "just decision in the principal case.' 44
The most notable standard-bearer in the conflicts revolution has
been Brainerd Currie,3 45 who condemned the "inane automatism"3 4 6
of traditional jurisdiction-selecting rules. Currie championed an ap-
proach that focused on the respective interests of states having some
connection to a case. If only one of those states has a "legitimate inter-
est" in applying its law, Currie believed that no actual conflict exists at
all; the court should simply apply the law of the state whose law and
337. See Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 772, 778 (1983).
338. See J.H. BEALE, 3 CASES ON THE CoNFLICT oF LAws 517 (1901); David F. Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 178 (1933); Walter
Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
457 (1924); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy, and the Conflicts of
Laws, 43 YALE L.J. 716, 736 (1924).
339. See Daily v. Somberg, 146 A.2d 676, 681 (N.J. 1958); Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis
L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLuM. L. REV. 959, 969-70 (1952);
Herbert F. Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156,
167 (1930).
340. RESTATEMENT, supra note 336. Another highly influential work was Story's trea-
tise. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND
DoMESTIc (Boston 1834).
341. Cavers, supra note 338, at 177.
342. Id. at 178, 181.
343. Id. at 192.
344. Id. at 193.
345. See generally CURRIE, supra note 205.
346. Id. at 161.
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policy would be vindicated.347 Where a genuine collision of interests
occurs, no mechanical, forum-neutral rule can yield a rational result.
Instead, Currie argued that the "rational pursuit of self-interest"3 48
ordinarily demands that the forum state resolve these true conflicts in
favor of its own law.349 Currie eventually modified his automatic pre-
sumption in favor of forum law by counseling courts to extend a sec-
ond "more moderate and restrained review" to determine whether an
apparent conflict in fact implicated valid interests by both states.350
However, he never retreated from his insistence that forum law must
ultimately prevail where it inescapably clashes with foreign law, or
from his rejection of "that mindless and ruthless machine"3 51 which
would dispose of conflicts through forum-neutral rules that fail to ac-
count for the interests involved.
Currie's ideas have played a large role in the proliferation of pro-
posed systems in the conflicts revolution. These theories have re-
duced somewhat the overriding status that Currie assigned to the law
of the forum.35 2 In particular, courts have been encouraged to con-
sider a broad range of factors to select the law that would produce the
best result in the case at hand.353 Notwithstanding numerous varia-
tions,35 4 however, these commentators have retained the common core
of Currie's philosophy that choice of law must rest on a foundation
less rigid than a certain kind of contact pointing ineluctably to the law
of a particular jurisdiction.
The impact of the newer approaches has been felt in the courts.
The New York Court of Appeals led the way when, in a wrongful
death action, the court refused to subordinate New York's public pol-
icy concerning damages to the contrary law of the state in which the
accident causing death had occurred.355 Two years later, in Babcock v.
Johnson,356 the court expressly embraced an approach toward choice
of law that drew heavily on the methodology of the conflicts revolu-
tion.35 7 Since Babcock the strict rule of lex loci delicti has yielded in a
347. Id. at 189.
348. Id. at 190.
349. Id. at 169.
350. Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 754,
757 (1963).
351. CURRIE, supra note 205, at 161.
352. See generally, Russell Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (2d ed.
1980); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1963); Singer, supra note 335.
353. See, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AmERICAN CoNFLICTs LAW 195 (3d ed. 1977).
354. Ironically, all of the "new" theories appear to operate identically in practice. See
Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 357 (1992).
355. Kilberg v. Northeast Airline, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527-28 (N.Y. 1961).
356. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
357. Babcock rejected the application of lex loci delicti to an automobile negligence
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majority of states to a variety of other approaches which all reflect the
triumph of the conflicts revolution over traditional methodology.35 8
Despite such success, recent years have witnessed a revived appeal
of territorial rules.359 According to critics, interest analysis fosters
discrimination against citizens of non-forum states 36 0 and has intro-
duced a degree of unpredictability incompatible with the ordering
function of choice of law.3 61 Conversely, concrete rules that require
only identification of the jurisdiction in which a specified triggering
event took place are said to avoid the vagueness and discretion that
produce the vices of interest analysis.3 62 Moreover, while Currie
presented his method as simply seeking to implement the intent of the
legislature,363 critics have contended that Currie and other interest
analysts have in fact disingenuously sought to substitute their own
substantive preferences for legislative will.364
B. The Internal Affairs Doctrine: A Persistent But Not Absolute Rule
Given the availability of competing schools of choice of law, justifi-
cation of the proposed fiduciary statute would appear to be simply a
matter of selecting the malleable and forum-oriented 365 approach of
interest analysis. Indeed, as a matter of positive law, nonconstitu-
tional choice of law principles could not bar a state from enacting such
action in which the accident had taken place in Ontario. Instead, the court ap-
plied the law of New York as the state with which the parties, their relationship,
and the automobile trip that led to the accident were predominantly connected.
Employing the criteria of "D]ustice, fairness, and the best practical result," the
court found these interests best served by giving effect to the policy of the juris-
diction "'most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litiga-
tion.'" Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
358. See Korn, supra note 337, at 776.
359. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 461 (1985)(foundations of interest analysis "fa-
tally flawed"); John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting
its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981)(interest analysis useful only in lim-
ited situation of common domicile); Korn, supra note 337.
360. See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 392, 408-17 (1980); Banks McDowell, Choice of Law in Insurance: Using
Conflicts Methodology to Minimize Discrimination Among PolicyHolders, 23
CONN. L. REV. 117, 136-37 (1990).
361. See Brilmayer, supra note 360, at 402-07.
362. See Ely, supra note 359, at 402-07.
363. See CURRIE, supra note 205, at 82.
364. See Patrick J. Borchers, Professor Brilmayer and the Holy Grail, 1991 Wis. L.
REv. 465, 473-74; Brilmayer, supra note 359, at 469-70; Maurice Rosenberg, The
Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 958 (1981).
365. Reflecting the success of the conflicts revolution, courts have increasingly
adopted a presumption that forum law should prevail. See Courtland H. Peter-
son, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 869, 871 (1981).
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a statute.366 However, the continued sway of the internal affairs doc-
trine367 would undoubtedly give pause to a legislature contemplating
such a step. Like doctrines in other fields that are strongly en-
trenched but not constitutionally compelled, the principle that issues
arising out of internal corporate relationships are governed by the law
of the state of incorporation3 68 is deeply rooted in corporate jurispru-
dence. Though far more congenial to traditional methodology than to
modern approaches, the internal affairs doctrine has proved strongly
resistant to the conflicts revolution.369 Nevertheless, the rule has not
been so universally applied as to render unthinkable consideration of
the proposed outreach statute. Though aligned as a matter of theory
with the eroded "vested rights" approach to choice-of-law issues,3 70
the internal affairs doctrine has flourished because it is thought to
serve practical ends as well. The qualities of predictability and uni-
formity cherished by traditional methodology are conditions deemed
indispensable to the effective conduct of corporate business. Fixing
the lex incorporationis as the exclusive regime by which a corpora-
tion's internal affairs are governed serves the need of managers to re-
fer to a single, identifiable body of law to determine their rights and
obligations.371 Moreover, as a contractual matter, those who form or
invest in a corporation are viewed as agreeing that internal disputes
shall be submitted to the law of the state authorizing creation of the
corporation.372
Although the category of "internal affairs" comprehended by the
rule remains indefinite, courts have rarely struggled to ascertain the
366. Louisiana, for example, has now completely codified choice of law. LA. CiV. CODE
ANN. arts. 3515-49 (West 1992); see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New
Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677 (1992).
367. This doctrine was referred to earlier in this article in connection with a discussion
of the commerce clause. See supra notes 288-96 and accompanying text.
368. See Kozyris, supra note 202, at 15. Professor Kozyris's article contains the most
extensive discussion of the ramifications of the internal affairs doctrine of which
the author is aware.
369. See Kaplan, supra note 208, at 464; Kozyris, supra note 202, at 17-26. Codification
by numerous states has reinforced this judicially crafted doctrine. E.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, para. 13.05,13.10 (Smith-Hurd 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.15-
050(3)(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-25-105(c)(1988); TEX.
R v. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8.02(A)(Vernon Supp. 1991). In addition to these ex-
plicit enactments, a number of statutes appear to have implicitly adopted the in-
ternal affairs rule. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-112 (1990); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-396(b)(West 1987).
370. See J. Thomas Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations-
Trampling Upon The Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85, 91-92 (1977).
371. See DeMott, supra note 13, at 161; Kozyris, supra note 202, at 49; J. Thomas Old-
ham, Regulating the Regulators: Limitations Upon a State's Ability to Regulate
Corporations with Multi-State Contacts, 57 DEN. L.J. 345, 350 (1980).
372. See State v. Great Northern-Chan Restaurant, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 732, 733 (Ohio
App. 1982); Kozyris, supra note 202, at 400; supra note 17.
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appropriate occasions for its application.373 For example, it has been
widely assumed that the adoption of by-laws,3 74 the issuance of corpo-
rate shares, 375 and the holding of shareholders' meetings376 are all
governed by the law of the state of incorporation. Both the proce-
dural377 and substantive378 requisites of derivative suits have gener-
ally been resolved by the lex incorporationis, as have questions of
indemnifying directors for litigation expenses.3 7 9 Further, courts con-
fronted with issues that relate purely to relationships among share-
holders, such as the construction of stockholder agreements38 0 or
notice requirements for shareholders meetings, 38 1 almost always defer
to the state of incorporation. Thus, the assertion made thirty years
ago that the internal affairs rule is "well established and generally
373. See Kozyris, supra note 202, at 15. Kozyris notes that the Restatement (Second)
of the Conflict of Laws offers an exhaustive listing of matters that could be char-
acterized as "internal affairs." Id. at 15, n.46. These include "the original incor-
poration, the election or appointment of directors and officers ... preemptive
rights, the holding of directors'... meetings, methods of voting including any re-
quirement for cumulative voting, shareholders' rights to examine corporate
records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consolidations and reorganiza-
tions and the reclassification of shares," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment a (1971); "the declaration and payment of
dividends and other distributions," id., at comment e; "who are shareholders," id.,
§ 303; "the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability... to [the corpora-
tion's] creditors for corporate debt," id., § 307; and "the existence and extent of a
director's or officer's liability to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders,"
id., § 309.
374. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 1124.
375. See, e.g., Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 2 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1932), modi-
fied on other grounds, 65 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 290 U.S. 673 (1933).
376. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws at § 302 comment a.
377. These would include requirements for making demand on both shareholders, see
Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d 631, 639 (8th Cir. 1987); Burt v. Dan-
forth, 742 F. Supp. 1043, 1048-49 (E.D. Mo. 1990), and directors, see Starrels v.
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1989); Tabas v. Mul-
lane, 608 F. Supp. 759, 764 (C.D.N.J. 1985), and for posting security for expenses,
see First American Bank & Trust v. Frogel, 726 F. Supp. 1292, 1298-99 (S.D. Fla.
1989); Recchion v. Kirby, 637 F. Supp. 284, 290 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
378. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1316 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480
U.S. 932 (1987)(standing of minority shareholder frozen out in short-form merger
to assert derivative claim against controlling shareholder); Brown v. Ferro Corp.,
763 F.2d 798, 802-03 (6th Cir.)(requirement of damage to corporation), cert de-
nied, 474 U.S. 947 (1985).
379. See, e.g., Lud v. Howard, 411 N.W.2d 792, 795-96 (Mich. App. 1987), appeal denied,
1988 Mich. LEXIS 596 (Mich. App. 1988); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1130-
31 (Wyo. 1985).
380. See, e.g., Davis v. Rondina, 741 F. Supp. 1115, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Rosenmiller v.
Bordes, 607 A.2d 465 (Del. Ch. 1991); but see Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Mo-
dell, 473 N.E.2d 807 (Ohio 1984), cert denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985); Zion v. Kurtz,
405 N.E.2d 681, 684 (N.Y. 1980).
381. See, e.g., Rare Earth, Inc. v. Hoorelbeke, 401 F. Supp. 26, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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followed throughout this country"3 82 remains a fair one.
Nevertheless, the internal affairs doctrine is not absolute; the Sec-
ond Restatement of Conflicts itself concedes that the "overriding in-
terest"3 83 of a state other than the state of incorporation may justify a
deviation from the lex incorporationis. Perhaps the most prominent
exception to the rule is the regulation of "pseudo-foreign" or "tramp"
corporations. These terms describe a corporation whose nominal in-
corporation in one state is belied by the presence of most of its assets
and economic activities in another. As long ago as the early 1940's,
some courts treated as established doctrine the proposition that signif-
icant affairs of a pseudo-foreign corporation can be subjected to regu-
lation by the state in which the corporation "in actuality"3 8 4 resides.3 85
The core principle represented by the pseudo-foreign corporation doc-
trine continues to receive support from courts386 and even from com-
mentators who generally endorse the primacy of the lex
incorporationis.3 8 7 Moreover, both California38 8 and New York3 89
have codified and expanded the doctrine by subjecting foreign corpo-
rations whose predominant contacts are with the state39 0 to substan-
tial portions of the state's corporation code.
Courts have also applied forum law in other contexts. For exam-
382. Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 703 (2d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 369 U.S. 885
(1962).
383. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAW, supra note 373, at § 302 com-
ment g.
384. State ex rel Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co. of Delaware, 2 N.W.2d 372, 386 (Iowa),
modifted, 4 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1942).
385. See id, at 385-86 (banning issuance of stock illegal under forum law); Toklan Roy-
alty Corp. v. Tiffany, 141 P.2d 571, 573 (Okla. 1943)(compelling corporation to
comply with forum law granting shareholder right to inspect corporation's books
and records).
386. See Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., 725 F. Supp.
1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Modell, 473 N.E.2d 807, 809-
10 (Ohio 1984), cert denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985).
387. See, eg., Kozyris, supra note 202, at 55, 57; Oldham, supra note 371, at 345-46, 366.
388. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990).
389. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 1315-1320 (McKinney 1986).
390. While other states have also enacted outreach statutes, California's and New
York's are considered the most ambitious. See DeMott, supra note 3, at 167. Cali-
fornia's provisions cover all foreign corporations where a majority of its business
is tied to California and a majority of its stock (not traded over a national securi-
ties exchange) is held in California. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a). For corporations
that fall into this category, California law supplants the law of the state of incor-
porations on a broad range of matters. Id. at § 2115(b). See generally, Michael J.
Halloran & Douglas L. Hammer, Section 2115 of the New California General Cor-
poration Law-The Application of California Corporation Law to Foreign Corpo-
rations, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1282 (1976). New York's provisions reach even
further, in that they apply much of New York corporate law to foreign corpora-
tions that do no more than derive a majority of their income from New York.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320(a)(2)(McKinney 1986).
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1
ple, while most courts apparently regard the question of whether to
pierce the corporate veil as a matter of internal affairs to be decided by
the lex incorporationis,391 some have dissented from such automatic
deference. 392 Courts have commonly invoked local law to compel for-
eign corporations to make their records available for inspection by res-
ident shareholders.3 93 Similarly, issues concerning the manner in
which the voting rights of certain shares may be exercised are often
determined by local contract law.394
C. The Fiduciary Exception
The liability of directors for breach of fiduciary duties to share-
holders appears to be a strong candidate for the roster of exemptions
from the rule of lex incorporationis. A state's motivation in holding
directors of foreign corporations accountable for their harm to share-
holders represents the type of interest to which modern approaches
give considerable weight. While courts generally assume that the lex
incorporationis governs directors' liability,3 95 significant authority
now concedes the permissibility of applying forum law under some cir-
cumstances. Most notably, section 309 of the Second Restatement pro-
vides an exception for those instances where "with respect to the
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship
... to the parties and the transaction, in which event the local law of
the other state will be applied."396 Comment (c) distinguishes conduct
391. E.g., Soviet Pan Am Travel Effort v. Travel Committee, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 126, 131
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Mikropul Corp. v. Desimone & Chaplin-Airtech, Inc., 599 F.
Supp. 940, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Daugherty, 599 F. Supp. 671, 672
(E.D. Tenn. 1984).
392. E.g., In re G & L Packing Co., 41 B.R. 903, 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), (applying federal
law to veil piercing), aff'g In re G & L Packing Co., 20 B.R. 789, 803-04 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1982)(whether veil should be pierced not dependent on state law); In re
Botten, 54 B.R. 707, 708 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985).
393. E.g., Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 199 So. 854 (Ala. 1941); Valtz v. Penta Invest-
ment Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. 922, 924 (DCA 4 1983); Jefferson Indus. Bank v. First
Golden Bancorporation, 762 P.2d 768 (Col. Ct. App. 1988); Morley v. Slider, 549
So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Sanders v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 84
N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1957); Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 141 P.2d 571, 573-74
(Okla. 1943).
394. For example, local law has been applied to resolve contractual aspects of voting
trust agreements. Tankersley v. Albright, 374 F. Supp. 538, 550 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 514 F.2d 956 (7th Cir. 1975); Jefferson Indus. Bank
v. First Golden Bancorporation, 762 P.2d 768 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Gries Sports
Enterprises v. Modell, 473 N.E.2d 807, 810 (Ohio), cert denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985).
395. See, e.g., Tabas v. Mullane, 608 F. Supp. 759, 764 (D.N.J. 1985); St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 412 F. Supp. 45, 60 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978);
Lachman v. Bell, 353 F. Supp. 37, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Armstrong v. Pomerance,
423 A.2d 174, 177 (Del. 1980).
396. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS at § 309.
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that "closely affect[s] the organic structure or internal administration
of the corporation" (for example, the declaration of dividends) from
acts such as seizing a corporate opportunity or causing the corporation
to make a contract or commit a tort.3 97 Issues of liability arising from
the latter category can "practicably" be resolved in different ways in
different states.3 98 While courts have traditionally applied the law of
the state of incorporation even to acts that fall into this second cate-
gory, another state's rule is "most likely to be applied where this rule
embodies an important policy of the other state and where the corpo-
ration has little contact with the state of its incorporation."3 99
Commentators on corporate choice of law have acknowledged that
directors' fiduciary obligations may afford more scope for outreach
provisions than "hard core areas"400 that demand governance by a sin-
gle regime. Professor Kozyris, for example, notes that the state of the
residence of the shareholders has a "superior claim" to the state of
incorporation because shareholders are the "ultimate beneficiaries" of
directors' fiduciary duties.401 Similarly, a commentator who has ex-
pressed concern over difficulties in applying some provisions of Cali-
fornia's outreach statute402 has endorsed the proposition that directors
of corporations covered by section 2115 should "behave in a manner
consonant with the highest standard of care prescribed in either the
California code or the law of the state of incorporation." 40 3 Consistent
with these views, some courts have looked outside the state of incorpo-
ration to determine management's fiduciary obligations where the
corporation's predominant contacts have lain elsewhere.404
397. I& at § 309(c).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Kozyris, supra note 202, at 64.
401. Id.
402. See Oldham, supra note 370, at 123-24.
403. Id. at 123.
404. See, e.g., In re ORFA Securities Litigation, 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.N.J.
1987)(forum state cite of corporation's principal place of business and much of
officers' conduct that formed alleged breach of fiduciary duty); Ficor, Inc. v. Mc-
Hugh, 639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982)(all of corporation's business and assets lo-
cated in forum state); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 392 A.2d 1233, 1240 (N.J.
Super. 1978) affd, 407 A.2d 1253 (N.J. Super. 1978), aff'd, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J.
1981)(forum state was corporation's principal place of business, domicile of par-
ties, and location of almost all payments at issue). In Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d
1196 (5th Cir. 1982) rehlg denied, 701 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1983), the court upheld the
liability of Moody, president and board chairman of an Alabama corporation, im-
posed by a Texas jury. Moody was found to have breached his duty to exercise
due care in the management of the corporation's affairs under Texas law. Id. at
1209. The court cited a provision of the Texas Business Corporation Act that sub-
jects officers and directors of a foreign corporation doing business in the state to
the same duties and liabilities as those imposed on officers and directors of Texas
corporations. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 8.01, 8.02 (West 1980), cited in Mey-
ers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209.
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These expressions of tolerance for plural fiduciary standards sup-
port the conclusion that fiduciary duties are not inherently either con-
ceptually or practically indivisible. The presumption in favor of
uniformity that undergirds the internal affairs rule is more appropri-
ately applied to questions such as the validity of a stock issue405 and
the validity of an election of directors.406 For states to tug corpora-
tions in different directions on such issues would undermine the sta-
bility of corporate governance. By contrast, differing state judgments
about the existence of director's liability for breach of fiduciary duties
do not fundamentally interfere with the ability of a corporation to do
business. They simply amount to a workable system under which dif-
ferent states elect to extend different levels of protection to their resi-
dents. In this respect they resemble the permissible variety of state
statutes governing the right to inspect shareholder lists407 or corpo-
rate books.408 In both cases the presence of a shareholder right in one
state is compatible with the absence of that right in another. It is true
that the type of outreach statute proposed here could prod directors to
comply with the strictest fiduciary standard to which they might be
subject. However, this result seems no more intrinsically objectiona-
ble than the opposite phenomenon under which the internal affairs
rule induces gravitation by corporations to states with the most lax
corporate laws and emulation of such laws by other states. 4 09
D. Weighing the Forum State's Interest
Even granting the legitimacy of fiduciary outreach statutes, criti-
cism of the particular statute proposed here might contend that its
sweep fails to meet even the liberal requirements of modern interest
analysis. Because the presence of a small number of shareholders in
the enacting state would suffice to trigger liability, the statute would
extend the forum's grasp beyond that permitted by the pseudo-foreign
corporation doctrine or even California's and New York's statutory
schemes. However, the nature of a state's interest in protecting resi-
dent shareholders from directors' misconduct does not vary with the
number of shareholders or the amount of corporate contacts with the
state. In other exercises of state police power, such as blue sky laws or
products liability, foreign companies' compliance with state law does
not hinge on quantitative impact. The presence of only a handful of
405. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 1137; see also William T. Coleman, Jr.,
Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HARV. L. REv. 433, 465-66
(1950)(legality of a dividend).
406. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 1141.
407. See Valtz v. Penta Investment Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. 922, 924 (DCA 4 1983).
408. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 1134-35.
409. See id. at 1127-28.
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offerees 410 or victims of a flawed product does not diminish a state's
interest in providing its residents a shield or redress from dangerous
behavior that originates elsewhere.411
Of course, advocates of Delaware would still contend that Dela-
ware's interest in governing the director-shareholder relationship
overrides that of the state adopting the proposed statute. Under one
view, the light fiduciary restraints placed by a state like Delaware re-
flect a coherent philosophy-embodied in other provisions of the
state's corporate code as well412-- concerning the extent to which cor-
porate management should be able to formulate decisions free of sec-
ond-guessing by shareholders. Accordingly, fiduciary outreach
statutes may frustrate that policy by injecting an unwelcome element
of caution into management's deliberations. Such disrespect for the
regulatory regime chosen by the corporation and its affiliates, it may
be said, ignores a major value of choice-of-law analysis: "tolerance of
the norm of another political community where the relationship be-
410. Many state blue sky laws do exempt offerings to a small number of individuals.
E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-2(10)(1989 & Supp. 1992)(twenty purchasers); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 1-203(d)(1965 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-
14(2)(g)(1989 & Supp. 1992). These exemptions however, probably reflect a judg-
ment that the full panoply of the registration process would impose an inordinate
burden on small businesses, see Manning G. Warren III, A Review of Regulation
D. The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities
Act of1933,33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 356-57 (1984), rather than a philosophy that the
state has no interest in protecting such persons from securities transactions disap-
proved by the state.
411. The refusal to adhere slavishly to the lex incorporationis when that law conflicts
with the forum's principles governing fiduciary duties also has precedent in com-
mon judicial attitudes toward enforcement of restrictive covenants in employ-
ment contracts. Courts frequently refuse to enforce such restrictions, though
valid where made, because they violate the public policy of the state in which
enforcement is sought. E.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods. Inc., 716 F.2d
1023,1032 (4th Cir. 1983); Muma v. Financial Guardian, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 119,121-
23 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239, 243
(Fla. 2d DCA 1973) cert denied, 285 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1973); but see Wilkinson v.
Manpower, Inc., 531 F.2d 712, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1976)(restrictive covenant in licens-
ing agreement entered into outside Florida enforceable in Florida courts as not
contrary to Florida's public policy, although agreement would be unenforceable
under Florida statute prohibiting this type of agreement). In both cases a power-
ful claim in favor of the lex loci contractus rests on a state's substantial interest in
regulating the terms of a relationship (director-shareholder, employer-employee)
entered into under its laws. However, even courts that are willing to accord sub-
stantial deference to the contractual regime under which an employment rela-
tionship was formed may decline to enforce that aspect of the employment
agreement whose enforcement would undermine a fundamental policy of the fo-
rum. See, e.g., Blalock v. Perfect Subscription Co., 458 F. Supp. 123, 127 (S.D. Ala.
1978), affld, 559 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1979)(refusal to enforce covenant not to com-
pete in hiring of independent contractor).
412. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (liberal provision for indemnification).
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tween the parties is centered." 413
The problem with the above assessment is not that it is incorrect
but that it is incomplete. In the last thirty years, reflexive obeisance
to the law of a state that can claim a particular connection to the par-
ties in question has yielded to pluralistic approaches. Among the most
important factors against such deference, of course, is promotion of
the forum's public policy through application of what it adjudges the
better law.414 A preference for the forum's fiduciary standards may
seem especially attractive where the interests perceived to be actually
embodied by the lex incorporationis are less appealing than those as-
serted in formal justification of it. For example, while Delaware may
clothe its permissive fiduciary rules in the theoretical accouterments
of efficiency,415 other states are entitled to act on the premise that less
highminded motives are at work. Delaware's suspected desire to at-
tract and retain lucrative corporate business 416 does not weigh so
heavily in the balance when pitted against the indisputable interest in
protecting resident shareholders from improper management conduct.
Nor under the proposal advanced here would adherence to the fo-
rum's view of fiduciary requirements come at the expense of other
values. The consistent imposition of reasonable fiduciary standards on
directors of domestic and foreign corporations alike renders inapposite
the criticism that interest analysis promotes discrimination against
out-of-state parties. Evenhandedness underscores the authenticity of
the state's interest in sheltering all of its resident shareholders from
the consequences of directors' carelessness.41 7 The growing acceptance
by courts 418 and legislatures4' 9 of the principle that foreign corpora-
tions enjoy no greater rights than domestic corporations bolsters the
legitimacy of subjecting all corporate conduct touching a state to a sin-
gle standard of responsibility.4 2 0
413. Singer, supra note 335, at 34.
414. See LEFLAR, supra note 353, at 195; Singer, supra note 335, at 6.
415. See In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del.
Ch. 1988); Solash v. Telex Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,608 (Del. Ch. 1988);
see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
416. See Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest
Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, 88-89 (1990); Cary, supra
note 11, at 668-69 (1974).
417. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981)(rejecting
contention that actual purpose of Minnesota ban on plastic nonreturnable con-
tainers was to promote economic interests of local dairy and pulpwood industries,
rather than state's professed environmental goals, where ban applied to contain-
ers regardless of source).
418. See, e.g., Jefferson Indus. Bank v. First Golden Bancorporation, 762 P.2d 768, 770
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Padovano v. Wotitzky, 355 So.2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
419. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-227; COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-9-104 (1986).
420. Similarly, concerns about vagueness, either of the reach of a fiduciary rule or of
the intensity of the state's interest in its application, see Kaplan, supra note 208,
at 472, would be dispelled by the express legislative statement contained in the
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E. A Limited Fiduciary Outreach Statute: the Appropriateness of Due
Care
Although the considerations described above would support out-
reach statutes designed to enforce all ordinary fiduciary duties, the
statute proposed here would penalize only violations of the duty of
due care. Confining the statute's scope to the familiar concept of neg-
ligence facilitates the ease with which it can be applied. At the same
time, the exclusion of breaches of the duty of loyalty reduces the po-
tential for intrusion on the interests and prerogatives of the state of
incorporation. The details of any such statute should be carefully tai-
lored to advance both of these goals. Much of the argument for defer-
ence to the corporate code of the state of incorporation rests on a
contractual conception of the relationship among incorporators and
among shareholders. Under this theory, enforcement of the lex in-
corporationis merely implements the rules of the jurisdiction that the
parties themselves have agreed shall govern their affairs.421 Hence,
the more the breach of a fiduciary obligation is viewed as violating a
contractual duty, the more compelling is the argument in favor of ac-
statute. See Kozyris, supra note 202, at 64 ("it is relatively easy for the fiduciaries
to learn about applicable rules and to conform to them"). The state can provide
adequate notice by announcing its intent to hold directors accountable for their
negligent conduct and spelling out the standard to which they will be held. While
legitimate concerns arise over the inherent imprecision of fiduciary obligations
and of the due care requirement in particular, these can be met by clear and
specific drafting. See supra Part I-B. Admittedly, compliance with numerous out-
reach statutes would present a more complicated task than does subjection to
local law by a pseudo-foreign corporation, whose management must familiarize
itself with one (or at most two) corporate codes. However, this task does not
differ dramatically in nature or scope from other multiple regulatory regimes
which corporations must navigate under the federal system: environmental re-
strictions, blue sky requirements, and taxation schemes. Even if difficulties in
drafting can be surmounted and directors sufficiently alerted to their obligations,
it might still be argued that the proposed statute ignores the original expectations
of the parties. That is, shareholders who choose to invest in a company may be
deemed to have submitted their relationship with its directors to governance by
the laws of the state in which the company is incorporated. To the extent that
this conclusion arises out of theories of contract, see DeMott, supra note 3, at 194,
the argument is undercut by the proposed statute's limitation to violations of due
care-a concept rooted in tort rather than contract. The significance of the tor-
tious nature of negligence is developed at text accompanying infra notes 464-69.
Beyond formal distinctions between tort and contract, modern society increas-
ingly looks to the state to protect individuals from a variety of injuries. The avail-
ability of local law to provide resident shareholders redress for directors'
carelessness no more defeats expectations than does the application of forum law
to hold distant companies responsible for their manufacture of products that in-
flict injury.
421. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text; see also State v. Great Northern-
Chan Restaurant, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 732, 733 (Ohio App. 1982)(comparison to "con-
tracting parties who validly agree that their potential contract disputes must be
heard and resolved in a particular state").
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cepting the lex incorporationis as the pertinent authority.42 2 On the
other hand, to the extent that a breach of fiduciary duty assumes more
of a tortious character, more latitude may be conceded to the law of
the forum. The relaxing of the sway of the lex loci delicti rule423 in
torts has left many courts willing to accord substantial weight to the
interests and policies of the forum.42 4 Thus, even deeming the injury
caused by a director's tortious conduct as having been in a sense (per-
haps a metaphysical one) inflicted "in" the state of incorporation
should not automatically defeat the application of forum law.
Negligence is a classic torts doctrine.425 In requiring a responsible
level of care from directors of foreign corporations whose conduct af-
fects resident shareholders, a state simply extends its general policy
regarding negligence to a particular facet of the corporate setting. By
contrast, imposition of local norms governing the duty of loyalty could
more plausibly represent an unraveling of the contractual bonds to
which shareholders and directors have committed. The organic rela-
tionship between directors and shareholders is formed partly in reli-
ance on the degree of conflict-of-interest countenanced by the state of
incorporation; outside demands of compliance with a more stringent
standard of loyalty would arguably amount to revision of the terms
upon which the corporate parties have agreed. The duty of due care,
however, transcends the contractual arrangements among those asso-
ciated with the corporation. Traditional doctrine rejects efforts to con-
tract out of duties owed in tort, especially the duty of due care;4 2 6 one
does not "agree" to be subjected to tortious conduct. And while the
state of incorporation may define the contours of the director's duty of
due care in the first instance, a lax standard should not bar other
states from implementing their own conceptions of negligence when
resident shareholders are affected.
Nor is the treatment of directors' negligence as an ordinary tort
merely a matter of abstract doctrine or convenient labeling. If care-
fully limited to specifically defined circumstances as described ear-
lier,427 the proposed statute would not constitute an ongoing intrusion
into corporations' daily governance. The difficulty of continual com-
pliance with a variety of regulatory demands is one of the chief argu-
422. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 691-93 (2d ed. 1992)(major-
ity of states still adhering to rule of lex loci contractus).
423. See supra note 390.
424. See Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gifford, 473 So.2d 220, 221-22 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985);
Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1987).
425. See generally W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 28-31 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
426. See Hull v. Bishop-Stoddard Cafeteria, 26 N.W.2d 429, 444 (Iowa 1947); see also
Patton v. Republic Steel Corp., 492 A.2d 411, 419 (Pa. Super, 1985).
427. See supra Part I-B.
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ments in favor of the internal affairs rule.428 Under the statute,
however, the need for heightened alertness to other states' require-
ments would be confined to a handful of discrete events. In invoking
the law of the enacting state only occasionally rather than regularly,
the statute would resemble the increasingly accepted application of fo-
rum policy to conflicts in torts rather than the constant interference
with corporate operations that proponents of the internal affairs rule
fear.42 9
Moreover, while the discrepancy between lax notions of due care
held by the state of incorporation and the greater responsibility re-
quired by the enacting state may amount to a genuine conflict, it gen-
erally does not represent an unusually severe one. Presumably even
the more indulgent state does not affirmatively object to directors' dis-
playing an abundance of diligence and care; it is simply more tolerant
of the failure to do so. In that sense the difference between the two
states' standards reflects differences in degree regarding the appropri-
ate level of care rather than a wholesale contradiction in policies.
Such a relatively modest departure from the policy of the state of in-
corporation supports application of the enacting state's statute to the
extent that the presence of shareholders there creates a legitimate in-
terest.430 Certainly enforcement of forum policy in this setting falls
within the admittedly capacious boundaries of modern interest
analysis. 43 '
Of course, the prospect of damages (or simply litigation) might in
428. See Kozyris, supra note 202, at 49.
429. See id. (contrasting isolated nature of typical tort dispute with corporation's "en-
tire system of private governance on a continuing basis"); see also DeMott, supra
note 3, at 193.
430. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 1138 (distinguishing between differences
in corporate statutes that represent variations in detail in pursuit of the "same
basic policy" and other types of differences.).
431. See Brilmayer, supra note 359, at 459 (criticizing the "infinite elasticity" of policy
analysis). Nevertheless, advocates of the primacy of the lex incorporationis
might argue for a state's prerogative to set an exceedingly low threshold of due
care for directors of its corporations in order to encourage the greatest amount of
entrepreneurial risk-taking. Viewed in this light, the gap between the policies of
the enacting state and the state of incorporation could not be dismissed as only a
nuance of difference in judgment about the appropriate level of care. Neverthe-
less, the proposed statute's application of its own more stringent standard can be
justified by the asymmetry between the impact of that choice and the effect of a
preference for the lex incorporationis. As discussed earlier, the imposition of
liability for damages for failure to observe a responsible level of care does not
preclude a transaction that is permissible under the lex incorporationis. See
supra notes 258-87 and accompanying text. Thus, the proposed statute's extrac-
tion of costs for injurious negligence does not amount to wholesale nullification of
the policies of the state of incorporation. Conversely, however, exculpation of
directors under the lenient fiduciary principles of the state of incorporation
would entirely defeat the enacting state's policy of providing redress to injured
resident shareholders.
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some circumstances deter the board from a course of action condoned
by the lex incorporationis. Even here, however, the enacting state is
justified in implementing its own view of the better law. In any
calculus of interests, the aim of the state of incorporation-to liberate
its directors to ignore precautions reasonably thought necessary by the
enacting state--does not seem especially compelling.432
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the proposed outreach statute would ef-
fectively promote state interests could provide new grist for the ongo-
ing debate between contractarians and more traditional proponents of
fiduciary duties. This article makes clear, however, that the debate is
not preempted by fundamental principles of constitutional law; such
principles do not stand in the way of a legislature wishing to protect
resident shareholders from harm caused by the negligence of directors
of foreign corporations. Jurisdictional requirements could in theory
make some directors inaccessible, but programmatically should have
little bearing in most instances. Similarly, the obligation of full faith
and credit does not preclude a state's application of its own law as rec-
ommended here. Finally, while the extraterritorial reach of the pro-
posed statute might superficially appear to run afoul of the dormant
commerce clause, closer examination of decisions under that doctrine
reveals that the statute does not share the flaws of legislation disap-
proved by the Supreme Court. Nor need a willing legislature fear
stumbling on nonconstitutional roadblocks. The novelty of the pro-
posed statute lies in its practical effect, not in any drastic departure
from universally recognized principles of choice of law.
The larger question posed by these issues is whether, in the ab-
sence of a federal fiduciary law, the law of the state of incorporation
must provide a substitute unity of regulation. Again, analyses rooted
in a favored economic model can be invoked to support the primacy of
432. The principle can be illustrated by the hypothetical example of a state whose
corporate code tolerates behavior by directors that would widely be regarded as
reckless. In that instance blind adherence to the internal affairs rule would leave
shareholders without relief from the consequences of even egregiously sloppy di-
rectors' conduct. It would not require an extreme bias in favor of forum law to
accept other states' insistence on applying their more conventional standards of
due care to assess liability in that situation. Those who endorse an expansive
notion of contractual freedom in corporate law, however, might dispute the need
to disregard the lex incorporationis even under these circumstances. Sharehold-
ers who suffered damages from highly negligent conduct would be deemed to
have accepted the risk of such injury by having agreed to the terms on which the
corporation was formed. Under this theory, market forces would deter corpora-
tions from tolerating directors' lapse from generally accepted norms; presumably
shareholders would not invest in companies in which the opportunity for abuse
was feared to be excessive. For discussion and critique of the contractual perspec-
tive on corporations, see supra notes 14-17, 23.
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the incorporating state. As a matter of legal doctrine, however, legal
thought has moved away from formulations that confer monopolistic
authority on a state. The devolution of power and responsibility from
the federal to state level does not mean that each state then becomes
the sole arbiter of all intrastate conduct, regardless of its impact else-
where. Neither Delaware nor any other state is entitled to co-opt the
Supremacy Clause. Rather, as reflected by the doctrines examined in
this article, states have considerable latitude to counteract the harm-
ful effects of activity that originates beyond their borders. A legisla-
ture that enacted the statute proposed here would be acting in
harmony with, not contrary to, evolving conceptions of federalism.
